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 Corporate Governance in Cyberspace  
– A Blueprint for Virtual Shareholder Meetings 
Dirk Zetzsche∗
This paper analyses the rules regarding the internet-based exercise of shareholder 
rights for public corporations incorporated in Canada, France, Germany, the U.S. 
(DelGCL & RMBCA), the UK and Switzerland. The traditional doctrine associates 
information, communication and voting with shareholder meetings. In addition, 
shareholder meetings regularly prompt reviews of management’s activities exercised 
on behalf of shareholders by accountants or the judiciary. The analysis reveals that 
the current regimes of shareholder meetings merely provide for voting and 
information in the context of a digital environment, while communication and review is 
usually not replicated.  
The lack of all functions of traditional shareholder meetings is one reason of why 
exclusively virtual shareholder meetings have not gained widely spread acceptance 
across jurisdictions. Another reason is that a well-fitting design for the web-based 
exercise of shareholder rights does not yet exist. Thus, the paper develops an 
advisable design of Virtual Shareholder Meetings that replicates all for functions of 
traditional shareholder meetings, while it is likely to reduce shareholder apathy at the 
same time. 
It argues that enabling more frequent opportunities for voting is the logical 
consequence of the developments of continuous disclosure requirements and 
continuous buy/hold/sell-decisions by market participants. Therefore, the virtual 
exercise of shareholder rights should be achieved through (1) liberalizing currently 
existing legislative and practical barriers, and in particular, time and place restrictions 
on shareholder meetings; (2) re-integrating analyst and institutional investor meetings 
in the process of shareholder meetings, and (3) substituting for the traditional face-to-
face accountability of managers to shareholders through specific electronic means. 
The latter involves, specifically, the use of RSS-Feed and XBRL-technologies for 
gathering and evaluating information, the use of the company’s website as the 
central communication platform for management to shareholders and shareholders to 
shareholders, and the election of an independent shareholder rights manager (firm) 
by the shareholder body with procedural, technical, and organizational authority for 
organizing the exercise of shareholder rights. Ideally, the blueprint presented herein 
achieves the harmonization of voting behavior and market reactions, thereby 
furthering market efficiency.  
                                            
∗ Dr. jur. (Heinrich-Heine-University, Düsseldorf, Germany [HHU]); LL.M. (Toronto), Habilitand at the 
Professorship for Civil Law, Commercial and Business Law and Center for Business & Corporate 
Law at HHU. The author is grateful for support provided by Kathleen Grandy, Michael Beurskens, 
Caroline M Bradley, Stephen Bottomley, Pierre-Henri Leroy, Howard M Friedman, Ulrich Noack, 
John F Olson, and Mathias M Siems. Failures and omissions are, of course, mine. All websites 
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I. Introduction 
Every year in late spring / early summer, thousands of public corporations all around 
the world send hundreds of thousand of pages of annual accounts, proxy materials, 
and proxy forms to millions of shareholders. Shareholders are expected to send their 
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ballots / proxy forms back to the firm, but few, in fact, do so. This process imposes 
significant costs on corporations, intermediaries, and shareholders. While many 
papers elaborate on the function of shareholder voting, in theory, and its inherent 
weaknesses there is – relatively speaking – little research that analyses the process 
of shareholder meetings. This lack of research is probably due to the fact that with 
respect to procedural rules, theory and practice are disconnected: theory is seldom 
familiar with procedural details, while practice is unlikely to invest time in theoretical 
considerations.  
Thus, this paper undertakes to analyze one aspect of the procedural rules - the use 
of the internet in shareholder meetings, for public corporations in Canada, France, 
Germany, the UK, the U.S. and Switzerland, from a comparative perspective. 
Further, on the basis of this comparative view, it suggests the direction in which the 
rules on virtual shareholder meetings should develop. Three good reasons account 
for such a study.  
First: To the same extent that the internet has lost its fashionable aura1 in the 
aftermath of the tech bubble in 1999/2000, academic interest in the convergence of 
traditional and new methods of exercising shareholder rights has lost its steam. 
Nowadays, few experts examine the topic systematically.2 A cross-border approach 
                                            
1 As an example for the net-based enthusiasm, see e.g. Bernhard Grossfeld, “CyberCorporation Law - 
Comparative Legal Semiotics/Comparative Legal Logistics”, 35 Int'l L. 1405 (2001). 
2 Australia: Richard Alcock & Andrew Daly, “Electronic Proxy Voting in Australia” (9/2003), online 
http://www.aar.com.au/corpgov/pubs/pdf/onlinevoting.pdf; Elizabeth Boros, ”Virtual Shareholder 
Meetings” 2004 Duke l. & Tech. Rev. 8, online 
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/2004dltr0008.html, and Corporate Governance in 
Cyberspace: Who Stands to Gain What from the Virtual Meeting?, 3 Journal of Corporate Law 
Studies 149, 150-55 (2003) (detailing UK, Australian and US reforms), and “Corporations Online”, 
(2001) Company & Securities Law Journal 19, 492; Denmark: Jesper Lau Hansen, “IT og 
selskabsretten”, Ugeskrift for Rettsvaesen 2000, p. 143, and “Focus: The listed companies and the 
electronic communication 1” (2003), Copenhagen Stock Exchange, Focus No. 62, online 
http://www.cse.dk/kf/kf_pressemeddelelser?languageID=1&c=Page&cid=1034698850162& 
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might thus well be justified in order to overcome the isolation which academics 
experience in their national ivory towers. 
Second: Shareholder meetings have long been the pariah in comparative corporate 
governance studies. Comparing the details of the rules on Virtual Shareholder 
Meetings might change this fact. Further, it might provide interesting insights that can 
                                                                                                                                        
contentid=1062141824343; France: Association Nationale des Sociétés par Actions (ANSA), 
Proxy Voting Reform in France: A Guide for Non-Residence Shareholders (Paris, January 2003), 
online <www.ansa.asso.fr/site/ACV_ANGLAIS_janvier2003.pdf>; Germany: Ulrich Noack, 
“Hauptversammlung und Internet: Information – Kommunikation – Entscheidung” (transl.: 
Shareholders' Meeting and the Internet: Information - Communication – Decision), CBC-RPS 0005 
(12/2004), online: http://ssrn.com/abstract=646723, and “Neue Entwicklungen im Aktienrecht und 
moderne Informationstechnologie 2003 – 2005”, NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FUER 
GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 2004, 297-303, and “Zukunft der Hauptversammlung - 
Hauptversammlung der Zukunft” (transl.: Future of the shareholder meeting – shareholder meeting 
of the future?), in: Zetzsche (ed.), Die virtuelle Hauptversammlung (“The Virtual Shareholder 
Meeting”), 2002, pp. 13 et seq., “Modern communications methods and company law”, European 
Business Law Review, March-April 1998, pp. 100-106, and, co-authored with Michael Beurskens 
“Internet-Influence on Corporate Governance”, EBOR 2002, 129; Dirk Zetzsche, “Die Virtuelle 
Hauptversammlung – Momentaufnahme und Ausblick” (Transl.: “The Virtual Shareholder Meeting – 
Snapshot and Look Forward”), ZEITSCHRIFT FUER BANK- UND KAPITALMARKTRECHT 2003, 
736, and Dirk Zetzsche (ed.), Die Virtuelle Hauptversammlung (Transl.: The Virtual Shareholder 
Meeting), Erich-Schmidt-Verlag, Berlin: 2002 [Zetzsche, Virtual Shareholder Meeting]; for further 
works in German language see  http://www.jura.uni-duesseldorf.de/service/hv/; Sweden: Rolf Skog 
“The institution of the general meeting and new communication technology – a few considerations 
de lege lata and de lege ferenda” (2000), online:  http://www.jura.uni-duesseldorf.de/service/hv/, 
and in JT 1/1999-2000; Switzerland: Hans Caspar von der Crone, “Die Internet-
Generalversammlung“, in: Festschrift Forstmoser (2003), pp. 155-167 [Von der Crone, “Internet-
Generalversammlung”]; United Kingdom [UK]: Verdun Edgtton, “Appointment of Proxies by 
Electronic Communication: Do Companies Have to Wait for Enabling Legislation?”, 21 Company 
Lawyer 294, 298 (2000); Rebecca Strätling, “General Meetings: a dispensable tool for corporate 
governance of listed companies?” (2003) Corporate Governance – An International Review 11:1, 
74; United States [U.S.]: Mentioned as side-issues of corporate law by e.g. Richard J. Agnich & 
Steven F. Goldstone, “What Business Will Look for in Corporate Law in the Twenty-First Century”, 
25 Del. J. Corp. L. 6, at 24 (2000); Robert Brown, Jr., “The Irrelevance of State Corporate Law in 
the Governance of Public Companies”, 38 U. Rich. L. Rev. 317, at 328, 380 (2003-2004); M.D. 
Goldman & E.M. Filliben, “Corporate Governance: Current Trends and Likely Developments for the 
Twenty-First Century” (2000) 25 Delaware J. of Corp. L. 683, 394. The few authors that focus on 
online-issues include Daniel Adam Birnhak, “Online Shareholder Meetings: Corporate Law 
Anomalies or the Future of Governance?”, 29 Rutgers Computer & Tech. L.J. 423, 445-46 (2003); 
T. Burns, “Implications of Information Technology on Corporate Governance” (2001) 9 Int. J. of L. 
and Inf. Techn. 21; Douglas R. Cole, “E-Proxies for Sale--Corporate Vote-Buying in the Internet 
Age”, 76 Wash. L. Rev. 793, at 797, 812 (2001); Howard M. Friedman, Securities Regulation in 
Cyberspace (New York, Bowne & Co Inc, 3rd edn: 2001), with supplements 2004 & 2005: Chapters 
11, 12; George Ponds Kobler, “Shareholder Voting Over the Internet: A Proposal for Increasing 
Shareholder Participation in Corporate Governance”, 49 Ala L. Rev. 673 (1997-1998); Mark 
Latham, “The Internet will drive corporate monitoring”, Corporate Governance International 3, 4-11; 
Ronald O. Mueller & Stephanie Tsacoumis, ”Proxy Solicitation and Stockholder Voting Using 
Electronic Media”, and Gavin A. Beske, “Shareholder Meetings Online”, in: John F. Olson & 
Carmen J. Lawrence (eds.), Securities in the Electronic Age: A Practical Guide to the Law and 
Regulation. 
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constitute the foundation for the more general questions encountered by 
convergence theorists.3 In particular, those questions regarding the perennially 
repeated, but nevertheless doubtful4 thesis by La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer 
                                            
3 One can basically distinguish three strands of thought in the international convergence debate. The 
formal convergenists believe that convergence at the level of formal legal rules is already largely 
complete, f.e. Brian R Cheffins, “Current Trends in Corporate Governance: Going from London to 
Milan via Toronto”, (1999) 10 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l. L. 5, 6; Jeffrey N Gordon, “Pathways to 
Corporate Convergence? Two Steps on the Road to Shareholder Capitalism in Germany”, (1999) 5 
Columb.J. Eur. L. 219; Jeffrey N Gordon “An International Relations Perspective on the 
Convergence of Corporate Governance: German Shareholder Capitalism and the European Union, 
1990-2000”, (2003) ECGI Law Working Paper No. 06/2003 (from SSRN) [Gordon, “International 
Relations”]; Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, “The End of History for Corporate Law”, (2001) 
Geo. L. J. 89, 439; Edward B Rock, “America's Shifting Fascination with Comparative Corporate 
Governance”, (1996) 74 Wash. U. L. Q. 367; Mathias M Siems, Die Konvergenz Im Rechtssystem 
der Aktionäre (transl. The Convergence of Legal Systems in the Law on Shareholders – A Study on 
Comparative Corporate Governance in the Era of Globalisation (Tübingen, Mohr: 2005) at §11 
[Siems, Convergence].  
The divergenists suggest that political forces and path dependence will limit the extent of 
convergence, e.g. Lucian A Bebchuck & Mark J Roe, “A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate 
Ownership and Governance”, (1999) 52 Stan. L. Rev. 127, at 132 et seq.; Douglas M Branson, 
“The Very Uncertain Prospect of “Global” Convergence in Corporate Governance”, (2001) 34 
Cornell Int’l L.J. 321, at p. 325 et seq.; William W Bratton & Joseph McCahery, “Comparative 
Corporate Governance and the Theory of the Firm: The Case against Global Cross-Reference”, 
(1999) Columb. J. Tran’l L. 213; David Charny, “The German Corporate Governance System”, 
(1998) Co. Bu. L. Rev. 145; Roberta Romano, “A Cautionary Note on Drawing Lessons from 
Comparative Corporate Law”, (1993) 102 Yale L.J. 2021, 2036; Mark J Roe, Political Determinants 
of Corporate Governance, (Oxford Univ. Press, New York, 2003), at 199-200 [Roe, Political 
Determinants].  
The functional convergenists put forth that different formal rules could produce similar outcomes 
with respect to the function, rather than the form of the rules, see Bernard S Black, “The Legal and 
Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets”, (2000-2001) 48 UCLA L. Rev. 781, at 
846 (but restrictions apply, see 838: if the jurisdiction is not caught in a “downsizing, self-reinforcing 
equilibrium”); John C Coffee, Jr., “The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Role of Law and the 
State in the Separation of Ownership and Control”, (2001) 111 Yale L.J. 1, at p. 77 [Coffee, “The 
Rise”]; Ronald J Gilson, “Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function”, 
(2001) 49 Am. J. Comp. Law 329, at p. 333 et seq. 
4 Re the legal assumptions, e.g. Markus Berndt, “Global Differences in Corporate Governance 
Systems”, in Peter Behrens et al. (eds.), Ökonomische Analyse des Rechts (transl. Economic 
Analysis of Law) (2002), at 17-18. Sofie Cools, “The Real Difference in Corporate Law between the 
United States and Continental Europe: Distribution of Powers”, Harvard John M. Olin Discussion 
Paper Series No. 490, Del. J. of Corp. Law (2005), online: 
www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/corporate_governance/papers/Cools_4901.pdf; Ronald 
J Gilson, “Complicating the Controlling Shareholder Taxonomy” (3/2003), online: www.uni-
bocconi.it/doc_mime_view.php?doc_id=24692&doc_seg_id=1; Detlev Vagts, “Comparative 
company law – the new wave”, in Festschrift für Jean Nicolas Druey (2002), at 600; Dirk A 
Zetzsche, “Explicit and Implicit System of Corporate Control – A Convergence Theory of 
Shareholder Rights”, CBC-RPS 0001 (8/2004), online: http://ssrn.com/abstract=600722 [Zetzsche, 
“Explicit and Implicit System”], and “Shareholder Interaction Preceding Shareholder Meetings of 
Public Corporations – A Six Country Comparison”, ECFR 1/2005, pp. 105 [Zetzsche, “Shareholder 
Interaction”]). Re the methods, e.g. Mathias M Siems, “Numerical Comparative Law - Do we Need 
Statistical Evidence in Law in Order to Reduce Complexity?” (2/2005), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=514142 and “What Does not Work in Comparing Securities Laws: A 
Critique on La Porta et al.'s Methodology” (10/2004), http://ssrn.com/abstract=608644 . 
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and Vishny [LLSV]5 of weak shareholder rights as an explanation for higher 
ownership concentration, and a relatively lower market valuation of firms in 
jurisdictions other than the U.S. and the UK.  
Third: All legislatures within the focus of this study have recently taken, or are 
actually considering, legislative action to alter the rules on shareholder meetings, in 
general, and virtual shareholder meetings, in particular.6 Furthermore, the European 
                                            
5 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, in “Legal Determinants of External 
Finance”, (1997) J. of Finance 52, 1131; “Law and Finance”, (1998) J. of Polit. Econ. 106, 1113; 
“Corporate Ownership Around the World”, (1999) J. of Finance 54, 471. 
6 Canada: CBCA amended by Bill S-11 (adopted 14 June 2001, assented to 24 November 2001); 
France: Act N 2001-420 Dated 15 May 2001 Relating to New Economic Controls modernised the 
French Code de Commerce (C.com); Decree dated March 23, 1967, as amended by the "NRE" 
decree n°2002-803 (May 3, 2002), implementing part III of the Act dated May 15, 2001 on New 
Economic Controls [Decree] regulates details by means of delegated legislature, see Association 
Nationale des Sociétés par Actions (ANSA), Proxy Voting Reform in France: A Guide for Non-
Residence Shareholders (Paris, January 2003), online 
<www.ansa.asso.fr/site/ACV_ANGLAIS_janvier2003.pdf>; Germany: KontraG (1998), NaStraG 
(2001), TransPuG (2002); further reform steps present the recently proposed Draft-“Law on the 
Improvement of Corporate Integrity and on the Modernization of the Regime governing Decision-
Directed Suits” of 17 November 2004 (transl. by the author) [UMAG] by the Federal Government, 
which is likely to come into force in 2005, online <www.bmj.bund.de/enid/jt.html>, see Ulrich Noack 
& Dirk A Zetzsche, “Corporate Governance Reform in Germany: The Second Decade,” CBC-RPS 
0010 (6_2005) online: < http://ssrn.com/abstract=646761 >, published in (2005) EBLJ 16:5 
(forthcoming) [Noack/Zetzsche, “Corporate Governance Reform in Germany”]; Ulrich Seibert, 
“UMAG und Hauptversammlung” (transl.: UMAG and shareholder meetings) WM 2005, 157; 
England: Step 1: S. 8 of the Electronic Communications Act 2000 with Companies Act 1985 
(Electronic Communications) Order 2000, SI 2000/3373 and the best practice guidelines by the 
Institute of Company Secretaries and Administrators (ICSA), “Electronic Communications with 
Shareholders” (12/2000); Step 2: Department of Trade and Industry [DTI], Company Law Reform - 
March 2005, at 16 et seq. and Parts D through F of the Company Law Reform Bill [UK Draft Bill 
(2005)]. This advanced reform proposal is based on the preparatory works by the Company Law 
Steering Group, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Final Report: Vols I and II 
(London: DTI, 2001) [Steering Group, Final Report], and the Secretary of State and Industry’s 
White Paper “Modernising Company Law – Draft Clauses” (July 2002), Cm 5553-I and II, Pt. 7, 
Chp. 3, and Pt. 8; all three documents can be downloaded from < www.dti.gov.uk/>; U.S.: Federal 
level: SEC releases permitting electronic delivery of proxy materials from corporations to 
shareholders, and from broker-dealers, transfer agents and investment advisers to their clients 
(cited by Mueller & Tsacoumis, supra note 2, at 7-11 et seq., and the Electronic Signatures in 
Global and National Commerce Act (the E-Sign Act), 106 Pub L No. 229; 114 Stat 464, effective 
October 1, 2000; State level: Delaware, “AN ACT TO AMEND TITLE 8 OF THE DELAWARE 
CODE RELATING TO THE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW”, Senate Bill No. 363/2000, effective 
July 1, 2000; for other state laws see Mueller & Tsacoumis, supra note 2, at 7-33 et seq.; 
Switzerland: Partial Revision of Corporate Law Proposal 2003, see Hans Caspar von der Crone, 
„Bericht zu einer Teilrevision des Aktienrechts: Teil 4: Stimmrechtsvertretung / Dispoaktien“, (2003) 
online 
<www.rwi.unizh.ch/vdc/team/Publikationen_HC/Bericht%20Teilrevision%20Aktienrecht%20Teil%2
04.pdf> [von der Crone, “Bericht”]. 
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Commission intends to harmonize shareholder rights across Europe.7 Given that 
shareholder meetings belong to the everyday-business of public corporations8 and 
that more and more firms offer means of electronic participation in corporate 
decision-making,9 it is particularly important to have a clear understanding of the 
different approaches of internet-based shareholder participation across jurisdictions.  
Based on a comparative method this paper asserts that the transition from the 
traditional shareholder meeting, which is based on physical attendance of 
shareholders, towards a virtual shareholder meeting that fits the needs of the digital 
age is still incomplete. Under the traditional doctrine, shareholder meetings fulfil three 
purposes: Dissemination of information; communication between shareholders and 
management and among shareholders; voting.10 In addition, shareholder meetings 
often trigger a review of management’s activities, exercised on behalf of 
                                            
7  See the first and the second consultation undertaken by the Directorate General Internal Market of 
the European Commission, “Fostering an appropriate regime for shareholders’ rights”, and the 
summary of the results of the first consultation, issued April 2005, online: < 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/company/shareholders/index_en.htm >.  
8  See OECD principles of Corporate Governance, Pt. II. With respect to the jurisdictions of this study, 
see ss. 132 et seq. Canadian Business Corporations Act [CBCA]; Section 3 of the French “Code de 
Commerce” (transl.: Commercial Code) [C.com]; s. 119 (1) German “Aktiengesetz” (transl.: Stock 
Corporation Act) [AktG]; Art. 698, 704 Swiss “Obligationenrecht” (transl.: Law of Obligations) [OR]; 
ss. 366 et seq. CA 1985 and Pt. D UK Draft Bill (2005); ss. 211 et seq., Title 8, Delaware Code 
[Delaware General Corporation Law - DelGCL].  
9 UK: CrestCo, Press Release 14 March 2005, online: 
http://www.crestco.co.uk/news/press_releases/press-04-05.pdf , for UK: more than one-third of 
issued capital voted electronically; in 2004 (2003) 88% of the FTSE 100, and 41% of the FTSE 250 
issuers announced a total of 273 meetings for which electronic proxy-voting was offered. Germany: 
German Secretary of Justice, Report to the Federal Parliament, see Ulrich Seibert, “Die 
Stimmrechtsausübung in deutschen Aktiengesellschaften – ein Bericht an den Deutschen 
Bundestag” (transl.: Exercising voting rights in German corporations –a report to the German 
Federal Parliament), on file with author, summary published in DIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 
2004, 529. I estimate that, in 2005, app. 80% among the DAX 30 companies offer some form of 
electronic proxy voting, and 40% of the DAX 100 issuers. Since electronic proxy voting is primarily 
used by retail shareholders, electronic proxies represented merely between 0.7% and 4.4% of all 
shares entiitled to vote. 
10 Eilis Ferran, “The Role of the Shareholder in Internal Corporate Governance: 
Enabling Shareholders to make better informed decisions”, EBOR 2003, 491; Ulrich Noack, 
“Information, Kommunikation, Entscheidung – Zur Corporate Governance der Hauptversammlung 
europäischer Aktiengesellschaften“ (transl.: Information, Communication, Decision – The Corporate 
Governance Function of Shareholder Meetings of Corporations in Europe”), Center of European 
Business Law (ed.), Bonn 2003; Strätling, supra note 2, at 74-75. 
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shareholders through special investigations by auditors or the judiciary. As this study 
unveils, however, the current regimes of the internet-based exercise of shareholder 
rights merely replicate some of the above functions of traditional shareholder 
meetings. Consequently, shareholders hesitate to rely exclusively on web-based 
exercise of shareholder rights for purposes of monitoring and advising management. 
At the same time, management has few incentives to offer efficient electronic means 
for the web-based exercise of shareholder rights. 
Achieving an efficient regime on virtual shareholder participation requires 
adjustments to traditional procedures. This paper argues in favor of a virtual 
shareholder meeting that (1) is freed from the time and place restrictions provided by 
traditional corporate law doctrine, (2) integrates the functions of analyst and 
institutional investor meetings, and (3) replicates the face-to-face accountability of 
managers, which is associated with traditional shareholder meetings. The latter 
involves the use of RSS-Feed and XBRL-technologies for gathering and evaluating 
of information, the use of the company’s website as the central communication facility 
for all shareholders who are not represented in the board, and the election of a 
shareholder rights manager by the shareholder body with financial, technical, and 
organizational responsibility for designing and monitor the exercise of web-based 
shareholder rights. This shareholder rights manager should replace the 
organizational authority re shareholder meetings (which corporate laws assign to the 
board / the chairman), as well as the review authority re the procedures (which is 
traditionally vested in notary publics, inspectors or corporate secretaries). 
The paper presents a blueprint for an efficient VSM, predicated on the following 
rationale. In a world of continuous disclosure and continuous buy/hold/sell decisions 
of market participants, more frequent opportunities for voting – a quasi-continuous 
- 9 - 
voting - will bring management’s activities more in line with shareholder interests and 
with market reactions, and thus improve market efficiency. Thereby, information from 
management will be given in quarterly-held virtual shareholder conferences; 
communication with management and among shareholders, organized over an 
independently organized, publicly accessible chat-board on the company’s website, 
will take place all-year-long; and voting will be exercised in the period after 
management has informed all shareholders in the shareholder conference. This 
design of internet-based exercise of shareholder rights will (1) improve corporate 
decision-making, (2) require management to follow shareholder interests to a greater 
extent than today, and (3) help align capital-market reactions with shareholder 
decision-making (i.e. voting).  
The paper is organized as follows. Section II pinpoints the topic of the analysis. 
Section III examines the law on internet-based shareholder participation from a 
comparative perspective. Section IV analyses the potential of the web as a tool for 
improving corporate governance, and analyses why – after a decade of some form of 
web-based exercise of shareholder rights – the full potential of the net has not been 
realized. Section V presents a blueprint for methods of shareholder participation in 
the digital age that integrates the lessons learned from the previous section. Section 
VI concludes. 
II. Scope of the analysis 
After having been widely neglected for many years, two factors are primarily driving 
the recent renaissance of interest in shareholder meetings: Globalization and 
- 10 - 
Digitalization.11 While Globalization initiates changes in national laws, thereby 
allowing shareholders to exercise their participation rights in shareholder meetings 
worldwide, Digitalization offers previously unavailable solutions for logistical and cost 
problems. Both aspects together culminate in the 2004 revision of the OECD 
principles of corporate governance that require companies to furthering cross-border 
voting through enabling electronic voting in absentia.12 Like a Sleeping Beauty 
suddenly waking, shareholder meetings found their way back into the awareness of 
corporate scholarship.  
Despite this recent legislative activism, the law of shareholder meetings remains 
confusing worldwide. Shareholder meetings are subject to provisions of federal 
and/or state corporate law, securities regulations, official and unofficial corporate 
governance codes, and a plethora of listing rules issued by stock exchanges. 
Furthermore, in the European Union, the Transparency Directive13 (and, in future, 
probably the Shareholder Rights Directive)14 coexists with national laws.  
                                            
11 Claudia Huberle & Dirk A Zetzsche, „Die Hauptversammlung zwischen Globalisierung und 
Digitalisierung“ (transl.: Shareholder Meetings under the Influence of Globalisation and 
Digitalisation), Handelsblatt, 21 March 2002, No. 57, at p. 41; Dirk A Zetzsche,”Die Virtuelle 
Hauptversammlung“ (transl.: The Virtual Shareholder Meeting), BKR 2003, 736, at 742 [Zetzsche, 
“Virtual Shareholder Meeting”]. 
12 OECD, Principles of Corporate Governance 2004, at II.C.4., online 
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf . 
13 Directive 2004/09/EC of 15 Dec 2004, O.J. L 390/38 (31.12.2004). 
14 With regard to the harmonization of shareholder rights in Europe, see supra note 7.  
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Table 1: Regulatory Levels of the Codified Law on Shareholder Meetings 
Legislation Canada France Germany UK U.S.  Switzerland 
Corporate Law 
Statute 
ss. 132 – 154 
Canadian Business 
Corporations Act 
[CBCA] 
Section 3 (Article 
L.225-96 - L.225-126) 
Code de Commerce 
[FrCC.] 
ss. 118, 241 et 
seq. Stock 
Corporation Act 
[SCA] 
ss. 352-382, 459 
Companies Act of 
1985 [CA 1985] 
 
Parts D-F UK Draft Bill 
(2005) 
ss. 211-233, Title 
8, Delaware Code 
[DelGCL]; 
§ 7.01 – 7.47 
Revised Model 
Business 
Corporation Act 
[RMBCA] 
ss. 691- 706b 
Law of 
Obligations [OR]
Corporate Law 
Regulation 
ss. 43 – 69 
Canadian Business 
Corporations 
Regulations 
[CBCR] 
Pt. IV of the Decree 
dated March 23, 
1967; "NRE" decree 
of n°2002-803, dated 
May 23, 2002  
Companies (Table A) 
Regulations 1985 
[Table A]   
Corporate 
Governance 
Code15  
AFEP/MEDEF, The 
Corporate 
Governance of Listed 
Corporations, No. 5 
Pt. 2, 6 of the 
German 
Corporate 
Governance 
Code [GCGC] 
Section D & E of the 
Combined Code on 
Corporate Governance
Inofficial CG 
codes16
Pt. I of the Swiss 
Code of Best 
Practice on 
Corporate 
Governance 
Securities Law 
Directive  
Art.13 Transparency 
Directive [TP] Art.13 TP Art.13 TP   
Securities Law 
Statutes 
ss. 84-88 Ontario 
Securities Act 
[OSA]  
s. 39 Stock 
Exchange Act 
[BörsG]  
15 U.S.C. 2B, s. 
78n (Securities 
Exchange Act of 
1934)  
Other 
Securities 
Regulation 
ss. 176-181 Ont. 
Reg. 1015/ NI 51-
102/ NI 54-101/ NP 
11-20  
ss. 63 et seq. 
Regulation 
concerning stock 
exchange listings 
[BörsZulVO] 
UK Listing Authority's 
Listing Rules: 
Guidance Man. App. 3
"The Contin. Obligat. 
Guide" 
SEC Regulation 
14A under the SEA 
1934, 17 C.F.R. at 
§ 240.14a [Rule 
14a-X] + other 
rules  
Listing 
Requirements 
TSX (Venture) 
Company Manual, 
f.e. s. 423.12, 455-
469  
Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange Listing 
Rules [BörsO 
FWB]  
f.e., ss. 401-2 
NYSE's Listed 
Company Manual 
[NYSE-M] 
ss. 1 – 8 Swiss 
Code of Best 
Practice on 
Corp.Gov, 
This study willfully disregards these different regulatory levels in order to provide a 
coherent description of the law on shareholder meetings. Further, though there exist 
a variety of corporate laws in Canada and the United States, this paper concentrates 
on the most influential regimes within each jurisdiction: in Canada, the Canadian 
                                            
15 All Corporate Governance Codes are available online: www.ecgi.org . 
16 In the U.S., public companies must file a corporate governance statement. The content of this 
statement is predicated upon recommendations of private organizations, in particular The Business 
Roundtable, “Principles of Corporate Governance” (May 2002); Council of Institutional Investors, 
“Core Policies, General Principles, Positions & Explanatory Notes” (Mar 2002); American Law 
Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis & Recommendations (2002). Further, the 
listing requirements establish minimum standards: NYSE, Final NYSE Corporate Governance 
Rules (Nov 2003); NASDAQ, Frequently Asked Questions on Corporate Governance. 
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Business Corporations Act [CBCA]; and in the U.S., the Delaware General 
Corporation Law [DelGCL] as well as the Revised Model Business Corporation Act 
[RMBCA]. Other state or provincial rules are not the subject of this study. 
Furthermore, the study focuses on the minimum standards of shareholder rights, as 
provided by law. It does not take into account the difference between enabling and 
mandatory provisions, i.e. that under some provisions management can act in a more 
shareholder-friendly fashion, though it is not obliged to do so.17 Another aspect that is 
willfully disregarded under this legal perspective is to what extent firms use 
opportunities with which the law provides them.18
Eventually, this paper presupposes that - particularly in a cross-border context - the 
problem of identifying the shareholder in indirect securities holding systems is solved, 
either through direct communication between the company and its shareholder, or 
through an efficient flow-through structure integrating the intermediaries in multi-tier 
securities deposit holding systems. This problem, which stems from the insufficient 
harmonization of corporate, banking and securities laws and that is currently 
                                            
17 In particular, management of British companies has traditionally had significant discretion, due to a 
mere handful of mandatory provisions in the British Companies Acts of 1985 [CA 1985] and 1989 
[CA 1989]. With respect to the current state of the law, the analysis is based on the model 
constitution for corporations as published in Table A to the Companies Act of 1985 [Table A], with 
effect from December 23, 2000, as amended by the Companies Act 1985 (Electronic 
Communications) Order 2000 and related secondary level legislation (supra note 6). However, the 
new Draft Bill issued in March 2005 by the British Department of Trade and Industry limits 
managerial discretion with respect to meeting procedures in several respects. 
18 It is recognized that an empirical analysis would be particularly helpful, given the few empirical 
studies that are currently available. See, with respect to Australia, Stephen Bottomley, “The Role of 
Shareholders’ Meetings in Improving Corporate Governance” (2003) Centre for Commercial Law – 
Faculyt fo Law – The Australian National University; on Belgium, see Christoph Van der Elst, 
Christoph Van Der Elst, “Attendance of Shareholders and the Impact of Regulatory Corporate 
Governance Reforms: An Empirical Assessment of the Situation in Belgium”, (2004) EBOR 5: 472, 
489; on Germany and the U.S., see Zetzsche, “Explicit and Implicit System”, supra note 4; on the 
U.S. Jennifer E. Bethel & Stuart L. Gillan,“ The Impact of the Institutional and Regulatory 
Environment on Shareholder Voting” (2002) Financial Management 31, 29.  
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addressed by European legislators19 as well as the European Commission,20 causes 
particularly dire consequences with respect to cross-border voting in Europe. The 
American system has encountered problems with integrating the rights of beneficial 
owners within the meeting procedure, as well. The underlying complicacies cannot 
be described here in detail.21  
III. Incomplete transition – virtual exercise of shareholder rights 
from a comparative perspective 
Traditionally, a shareholder meeting fulfills three functions: shareholder information, 
communication and voting.22 Further, shareholder meetings often prompt reviews of 
                                            
19 France, see Michel Storck, “Corporate Governance à la Francaise – Current Trends” ECFR 2004, 
37, 54 on the reforms of Artt. L228-1 et seq. C.com by Ordonnance nº 2004-604 (June 24, 2004), 
Official Gazette of June 26, 2004, Art. 24; Germany, see supra note 6 [s. 123 AktG reformed by the 
UMAG (2005), and s. 67 AktG reformed by NaStraG (2001)]; UK, pp. 36 et seq. & Pt. E of the UK 
Draft Bill (2005), supra note 6; Ferran, supra note 10, at 509; Paul Myners, “Review of the 
impediments to voting UK shares – report to the Shareholder Voting Working Group” (1/2004), 
online: http://www.manifest.co.uk/myners/myners.htm; at pp. 14 et seq.; Switzerland: von der 
Crone, “Bericht”, supra note 6, at 12 et seq. The same problems exist(ed) in the U.S. 
20 European Commission, supra note 7. The report relies on the recommendations by the Expert 
Group on Cross-Border Voting, “REPORT ON CROSS-BORDER VOTING BY SHAREHOLDERS” 
(Sept 2002), online: <www.jura.uni-duesseldorf.de/dozenten/noack/texte/normen/amsterdam/ >; 
the report primarily concerns corporate law issues. Some securities law issues are discussed in the 
First and Second Report on EU cross-border clearing and settlement arrangements (Giovaninni-
Reports), commissioned on behalf of the European Commission, online 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/giovannini/clearing_settlement_en.htm; thereon, e.g.: 
The Bank of New York, European Clearing and Settlement Handbook, online: 
http://www.bankofny.com/htmlpages/ain_1056.htm . Further, the Unidroit- and The Hague-
Initiatives seek to harmonize national laws with respect indirect securities depository systems, see 
special edition 1/2005, in Common* Law Review. 
21 See Maria-Teresa Marchica & Roberta Mura, “Direct and Ultimate Ownership Structures in the UK: 
an intertemporal perspective over the last decade”, (2005) Corporate Governance: An International 
Review 13:1, 26; Mueller & Tsacoumis, supra note 2, at 7-7 et seq.; Andreas Rahmatian, “The 
issue and transfer of shares under English and German law: an outline”, The Company Lawyer, 
Vol. 23, 2002, 252-260; Teo Tsu Min Cynthia, „The multi-tier contest – competing priorities in an 
indirect holding system“ (2003) 21 Company & Securities Law Journal 168; Ulrich Noack, 
“Aktionärsrechte im EU-Kapitalbinnenmarkt” (transl.: Shareholder Rights within the EU Common 
Market”), ZEITSCHRIFT FUER WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT (ZIP) 2005, 325, 327; Ulrich Noack & Dirk 
Zetzsche, “Die Legitimation des Aktionärs“ (transl.: Identification of Shareholders), DIE 
AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 2002, p. 651 et seq., und “Aktionärslegitimation bei sammelverwahrten 
Inhaberaktien”, (transl.: The Identification of Shareholders of Companies Issuing Bearer Shares 
hold in Custody of a Central Depository System), WERTPAPIERMITTEILUNGEN 2004, p. 1 et 
seq. 
22 Supra note 10.  
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whether the directors and officers - in two-tier jurisdictions, the board of management 
and the supervisory board [herein “management”]23 -, the controlling shareholders, or 
the shareholder meeting itself violated statutes, charters, bylaws, or other corporate 
rules in the conduct or the exercise of voting power at the meeting. This review is 
commonly exercised by auditors on behalf of shareholders, or the judiciary. This 
categorization provides a good measurement of the degree to which the law on 
shareholder meetings has completed the transition into the digital age. 
1. Information 
The company may provide information to shareholders via two different methods, 
which will be referred to as the “pull” and the “push” method.  
a) Pull 
First, a company may make information available to shareholders who may access 
the information at the pre-determined place (“pull” method). Traditionally, these 
places were the company headquarters or company registers. Shareholders could 
come to these places and take a look at the stored documents. Meanwhile, quoted 
companies are either required to disclose corporate information on their website, or 
to send it to regulators, stock exchanges or commercial information providers for 
disclosure through the storage and retrieval systems or electronic official gazettes 
run by these entities.24 This is also true with respect to meeting-related information, 
                                            
23 For reasons of simplicity, I generally refrain from distinguishing between directors and officers, and 
the board of management and the supervisory board, respectively. 
24 The specific media for disclosure of company data differ. See e.g. with regard to Germany Ulrich 
Noack, “Digital Disclosure of Company Data in Germany and Europe - Regarding the 
Implementation of the Disclosure Directive (2003) and the Transparency Directive in Germany”, 
AZW Working Paper No. 2004_10_01 (from SSRN). Across Europe, some harmonization will result 
from the implementation of Artt. 19-22 of the Transparency Directive (supra note 13). 
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such as the annual account and related reports,25 the notice of the meeting and the 
proxy-related materials,26 shareholders’ requisitions,27 a web-cast of the meeting,28 
the voting results,29 and a variety of other information.30 Active investors who look for 
meeting-related information will be able to find and download this information easily.  
b) Push 
Alternatively, a company may be obliged to send or supply information to the 
recipient (“push” method). The underlying rationale for utilizing such a method is that 
under the pull-method, passive shareholders will not receive any information, and are 
                                            
25 Canada: National Instrument No. 51-102 “Continuous Disclosure Obligations” [NI 51-102], Pt. 4 –6, 
requiring disclosure on SEDAR (Ontario securities act); France: L225-115 & Art. 124 (1) Decree; 
Germany: ss. 39 (1) No. 3, (2) BörsG, 65 (1) BörsZulVO, No. 71 BörsO FWB (website 
stockexchanges) and No. 6.8 DCGK (corporate website); Switzerland: Art. 697h (1) (if not send to 
any person requiring the company to do so); UK: No. 1.24, 1.25 and Chapters 8-14 of the UK 
Listing rules; U.S.: SEC Regulation S-X, requiring disclosure on EDGAR, and S. 203.01A of the 
NYSE-M. 
26 Canada: s. 134 (3) CBCA & NI 51-102, Pt. 9; France: Art. L225-108 C.com & Art. 130 Decree; 
Germany: ss. 121, 25 sent. 1 AktG (official gazette), ss. 63 (1), 66 (1) BörsZulVO, 71 BörsO FWB 
(stock exchange) and No. 2.3.1 GCGC (corporate website); Switzerland: subject to the articles and 
listing requirements of the stock exchanges, see Anhang I des Rundschreibens Nr.1, issued by the 
SWX, online http://www.swx.com/download/admission/regulation/circulars/abcircular_001_de.pdf ; 
UK: CA 1985: No. 115 of Table A (as amended by Schedule 1 to the Companies Act 1985 
(Electronic Communications) Order 2000, referring to the best practice guidelines issued by the 
Institute of Company Secretaries and Administrators (ICSA), Electronic Communications with 
Shareholders (12_2000) and ibid; UK Draft Bill (2005): ss. D26, Schedule F3, Pt. 3,4; U.S.: Rule 
14a-6(e) and s. 401.01-02, 402.00-03 NYSE-M. 
27 In Canada, the U.S. and Switzerland, as well as currently in the UK, requisitions must not be filed 
after the notice of the meeting. Consequently, they are either disclosed in the management’s 
circular or filed as proxy materials issued by the petitioner, see Zetzsche, “Shareholder Interaction”, 
supra note 4, at III 2. In the other countries, petitions may be filed as response to a management 
proposal. France: L225-115 No. 3 & Art. 130 Decree; Germany: ss. 126 (1), 127 AktG; UK: ss. D58 
(1) (a) UK Draft Bill (2005). 
28 E.g. recommended by No. 2.3.4 GCGC, as permitted under s. 118 (3) AktG (if the articles so 
provide). 
29 E.g. Canada: NI 51-102, Pt. 11.3 (SEDAR); UK: No. 4.25 b) (ii) Continuing Obligations Guide; the 
same disclosure will be mandatory under the new British law, see DTI, White Paper (March 2005), 
supra note 6, at 17. 
30 German companies sometimes disclose a summary of the Question & Answer session of the 
shareholder meeting, see Zetzsche, “Explicit and Implicit System”, supra note 4. 
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even less likely to exercise their rights than if they received some information and the 
proxy forms, as a “reminder” of their rights. Thus, corporate law requires the 
company to send (at least) the notice of the meeting with the proxy-related materials 
to their shareholders.31 In ancient times of paper-based distribution, push-information 
required major logistical efforts and imposed high process costs on companies. In the 
digital age, however, “push” may easily and inexpensively take place through 
forwarding the link to the relevant information disclosed on the company’s website to 
the shareholder’s email account.32  
With regard to push-information, the transition is, however, still incomplete. Three 
kinds of hurdles hamper the smooth transition towards digital exercise of shareholder 
rights. 
First, under some laws, the shareholders of the company must resolve that the 
company may send documents or other information to members. The reason for this 
requirement is unclear. The information is publicly available in digital form under the 
pull-provision. The method of how a shareholder likes to receive corporate 
information thus merely concerns the individual shareholder. Furthermore, this 
                                            
31 Canada: s. 135 (1), 253 CBCA; France: Art. L225.108 C.com and Art. 120-1, 124 (registered 
shares), 125 Decree; Germany: s. 125 (1), (2) AktG for shareholders of record, s. 128 (1) AktG for 
beneficial owners holding registered shares and shareholders holding bearer shares; Switzerland: 
Art. 696 (2) OR (registered shareholders); UK: CA 1985: s. 370 (2) & No. 111 et seq. Table A & 
D.2.4 Combined Code on CG (2003); UK Draft Bill (2005): ss. D26, D27, D 42 (1); U.S.: Rule 14a-3 
for record shareholders; Rule 14b-1/2 and Rule 14a-13(c) for non-objecting and consenting 
beneficial owners (NOBO and COBO-lists); Rule 14a-13(d) for certain employee-shareholders; 
depositories are required to forward information to other shareholders according to Rules 14a-13(a) 
(preparation) and 14b-1(b) and 14b-2(b) (execution); ss. 222 (b), 229, 230 DelGCL; ss. § 7.05-06 
RMBCA. 
32 Expressly stipulated in Canada: No. 7 (2) CBC Regulations; UK: s. 369 (4B) – (4C) CA 1985; No. 
1.24 UK Listing Rules; Schedule F3, Pt 4, No. 10, 15 UK Draft Bill (2005); U.S.: s. 232 (b) (3) 
DelGCL; the SEC Electronic Media Release (April 26, 2000) clarifies that a hyperlink embedded 
within any document required to be filed or delivered under the federal securities laws causes the 
hyperlinked information to be a part of that document, see online 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2000-53.txt. 
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requirement might hamper efficient exercise of shareholder rights since one (let’s 
say: local, controlling, institutional) shareholder group might utilize it in order to keep 
another (international, retail etc.) shareholder group from organizing itself efficiently. 
This can occur, because postal delivery takes precious time in the short period 
preceding the shareholder meeting.  
Second, the regimes require the companies (or the intermediary between the 
company and the shareholder) to obtain the prior consent of the addressees before 
the company may send information by electronic means. Without the shareholder 
providing his email-address or other access-points, the company cannot fulfil its 
sending-/delivery-requirement by electronic means. Thus, the shareholder’s consent 
is a natural barrier which does not need any regulatory activity. Simple data storage 
requirements that document that the shareholder provided his electronic address to 
the company suffice. Many regimes nevertheless require that a shareholder must 
consent in writing, and some set even more burdensome formal requirements as a 
precondition for the use of electronic communication facilities.  
Finally, many shareholders are chronically passive. For example, truly passive 
shareholders may not send back declarations of consent to the use of electronic 
communication methods, even if corporations provide free envelopes, or lure 
shareholders to send back the declarations with small gifts. “Deemed Consent” 
provisions may help to overcome this problem, such as that provided by the new 
British Draft Bill. Under this draft, a person is taken to have agreed that the company 
may send information to him / her electronically if  
(a) he has been asked individually by the company to agree that the company may send 
or supply documents or information generally, or the documents or information in 
question, to him in that manner, and 
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(b) he has failed to respond within the period of 28 days beginning with the date on which 
the company’s request was sent.33
Such a “deemed consent” provision may increase the level of participation in 
methods of electronic communications significantly and thereby reduce costs 
imposed on the company / all shareholders. At the same time, “deemed consent” 
provisions do not impose unjust requirements on old, non-internet skilled 
shareholders, since (1) these shareholders either do not have an email account, and, 
hence, a company cannot fulfil its supply requirements vis-à-vis these shareholders 
electronically, or (2) if these shareholders have given their email account to the 
corporation, they may always revoke their consent to the electronic supply of 
corporate information. A “deemed consent” provision thus merely operates to deem 
consent to be given by “lazy”, but technically proficient, shareholders.  
Table 2: Requirements for “Push”-information by electronic means 
Jurisdiction Shareholder Resolution 
required 
Formal requirements 
with regard to Individual 
Shareholder’s Consent 
“Deemed / Implied 
Consent” provision 
Canada34 - (unless by-laws / articles 
provide otherwise) 
In writing - 
France35 - In writing; if shareholder 
requires email 
communication, 
registered mail with return 
receipt 
- 
Germany36 - - - 
Switzerland37 no regulation no regulation no regulation 
UK38 CA 1985: -; 
UK Draft Bill (2005): yes 
CA 1985: In writing 
UK Draft Bill (2005): - 
CA 1985: -; 
UK Draft Bill (2005): yes 
                                            
33 UK Draft Bill (2005): Schedule F3, Pt 4, No. 1 (4). 
34 Ss. 252.3 (2), 252.4 CBCA & No. 7 (1) CBC Regulations. 
35 Art. L225.108 C.com and Art. 120-1 Decree (referred to by Att. 124 (2), 125 (1), 129 (1), 131 (1), 
138  Decree). 
36 Ss. 125 (1), (2) and 128 AktG, No. 2.3.2 GCGC. 
37 The Swiss regulation on these issues is very basic.  
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U.S.39  - SEC: -  
RMBCA: no regulation; 
DelGCL: -, written notice 
for revocation 
SEC: (for employee 
shareholders only) - 
                                                                                                                                        
38 S. 369 (4A) – (4F) CA 1985, Regulation 115 of Table A under the CA 1985, as amended by 
Schedule 1 to the Companies Act 1985 (Electronic Communications) Order 2000, refers to the best 
practice guidelines by the Institute of Company Secretaries and Administrators (ICSA), Electronic 
Communications with Shareholders (12_2000), which recommends at ¶4.4 that the initial invitation 
to receive documents electronically should be send by post; Schedule F3, No. 6, 7 UK Draft Bill 
(2005).  
39 SEC, “Use of Electronic Media for Delivery Purposes,” Securities Act Release No. 33-7233, 60 Fed. 
Reg. 53, 458 (October 6, 1995), as clarified through “Use of Electronic Media,” Securities Act 
Release No. 33-7856 (May 4, 2000), footnote 106; s. 232 (a) DelGCL. Practice, in particularly 
during proxy fights, distinguishes between the proxy statements to which no deemed consent 
provision applies and other materials, such as additional information, see Mueller & Tsacoumis, 
supra note 2, at 7-24. 
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c) Information sent to a company 
Finally, some laws specify time periods during which shareholders may send 
information to the company by electronic means. These provisions concern 
shareholder requisitions, demands for polls and proxies. Generally speaking, the 
laws studied here impose some or all of the following requirements:  
(1) the shareholder confirms his identity and authenticates his shareholding, if 
applicable, through an intermediary;40 
(2) the information is sent to the address and in that manner specified for that 
purpose by the company;41 
(3) the firm agrees that the document may be sent in this specific electronic form 
(e.g. filling in a form provided on website, email, electronic data transfer).42 
Only some laws mandate that companies receive information electronically.43 
Requirements (1) and (2) are necessary in order to create certainty. The third 
requirement, however, is only justified with respect to the use of the specific 
electronic form. This is because a company must ensure that they can register and 
                                            
40 E.g. Canada: s. 252.7 CBCA; France: Art. 131-3 No. 3, 132, 134, 136, 145-3 Decree; U.S.: s. 212 
(c) DelGCL; UK: Schedule F1, Pt. 3 No. 6 (1) UK Draft Bill. 
41 E.g. Canada: s. 252.3.(2) (b) CBCA; Germany; s. 123 (3) 3 AktG for authentications of shareholders 
issued by depository banks (bearer shares); s. 126 (1) for counter-proposals; UK: s. 253 (2A) CA 
1985. 
42 E.g. Canada: s. 132 (4) CBCA (if company makes available ...) & s. 252.3.(2) (a) CBCA; UK: D50 
(1), (2) (“where a company has given an electronic address”), Schedule F1, Pt. 3 No. 6 (1) UK Draft 
Bill. 
43 The most extensive access-requirements are set up by the U.S. Federal “Electronic Signatures in 
Global and National Commerce Act [E-Sign Act]”, 106 Pub L No 229; 114 Stat 464, but some 
questions as to its scope and consequences remain, see Mueller & Tsacoumis, supra note 2, at 7-
27 et seq. For some, but not all, shareholder activities: France: Art. 128 Decree (shareholder 
requisitions); Art. 131-1 (requesting ballot form); Germany, see supra note 41. 
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process all of the proxies, requisitions, poll demands etc. sent by – sometimes - 
hundreds of thousands of national and international shareholders.  
Requiring the company’s consent to the use of electronic media, in general, however, 
is anachronistic. Further, it is biased against shareholders abroad who will hardly be 
able to send their requisitions or proxies in a traditional way to the company within 
the narrow timeframe specified by some corporate laws. For example, in some of the 
largest German (DAX30-) companies, foreign shareholders hold more than 50% of 
the shares.44 Under these circumstances, denying foreign shareholders electronic 
access is analogous to doubling the value of local shareholder’s votes. Due to this, I 
submit that German companies with a significant share of international shareholders 
must not deny electronic access in the period preceding the meeting.45 The same 
fairness-principle on which this statement is founded is also relevant to the laws of 
other jurisdictions, e.g. with respect to the U.S. in s. 7.08 (c) RMBCA.46  
2. Voting 
The last statement leads into to the topic of electronic voting. This may take place 
through a) Electronic Proxy Voting [EPV], b) Electronic Direct Voting [EDV], and in 
some jurisdictions, through c) Virtual Shareholder Meetings [VSM]. In all jurisdictions, 
all three models are always legitimate with the shareholders’ unanimous consent. 
The following section thus merely regards shareholder meetings of companies in 
which the use of technology is a contentious issue among shareholders.  
                                            
44 Zetzsche, “Explicit and Implicit System”, supra note 4. 
45 Zetzsche, BKR 2003, 736 et seq. 
46 Stating: “Any rules adopted for, and the conduct of, the meeting shall be fair to shareholders.” 
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a) Electronic Proxy Voting [EPV] 
EPV refers to the electronic issuing, authentication and submission of proxy 
appointments to the corporation. EPV is probably the least controversial of the 
internet-based methods of exercising shareholder rights.47 All jurisdictions within the 
purview of this study allow for some form of EPV. When EPV first became a real 
possibility at the beginning of the 21st century, most jurisdictions merely changed the 
formal requirements of assigning proxies to a private or corporate-sponsored 
representative. Specifically, there was a move from requiring a proxy solely in writing 
to mandating some type of digital equivalent, such as email, fax, or even a proxy 
saved on disk in addition to the written proxy. Accompanying this switch, generic e-
commerce issues48 were widely discussed, such as the meaning of “signature”, 
“authentication”, “delivery” and “access”/”storage”, in the context of web-based 
systems. Meanwhile, these issues have been settled, for the most part, with 
regulatory support.49  
An advanced model of EPV combines modern methods of information dissemination 
(web-cast) with EPV. Under this model, which is, for example, common in Germany 
and specifically provided for under French law,50 shareholders may direct their 
representative through the use of the internet until the ballots are cast within the 
                                            
47 Elizabeth Boros, “Virtual Shareholder Meetings”, 2004 Duke L. & Tech. Rev. No. 8, at A. 
48 Beske, supra note 2, at 8-17; Boros, “Virtual Shareholder Meetings”, supra note 2, at A. 
49 Canada: ss. 252.5-252.7 CBCA & CBC Regulations, No. 6 et seq.; France: Artt. 131-133 Decree; 
Germany: ss. 126a, 126b Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (German Civil Code); Switzerland: Art. 14 OR; 
UK: Statutory Instrument 2000/3373 [The Companies Act 1985 (Electronic Communications) Order 
2000] and best practice guidelines by the Institute of Company Secretaries and Administrators 
(ICSA), Electronic Communications with Shareholders (12_2000), ¶10.4; UK Draft Bill (2005): s. 
F5; U.S.: E-Sign Act, supra note 43, for details see Friedman, supra note 2, ¶ 11.05; ss. 211 (b), 
212 (c) (3)  DelGCL; less specific § 7.22 (a) RMBCA.  
50 Artt. 145-2 – 145-4 Decree. 
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physical meeting. Under this model, the proxy’s function is limited to that of a 
messenger. 
b) Electronic Direct Voting [EDV] 
EDV systems enable shareholders to vote directly over the internet, without a proxy 
connecting the “web-” and the “physical sphere”. With regard to EPV, two different 
legal relationships exist: on the one hand, the relationship between the shareholder 
and his representative, a relationship that is primarily governed by agency law; on the 
other hand, the corporate law-based relationship between the shareholder and the 
corporation.51 In contrast, no intermediary/ representative is involved in EDV. Merely 
one legal relationship exists between the corporation and its shareholders. Similar to 
EPV, the voting may take place in advance of the meeting, or simultaneously if the 
meeting is web-cast. 
This advanced form of internet-based shareholder participation has not yet achieved 
general acceptance across the jurisdictions, for two primary reasons. First, under the 
laws of Germany and Switzerland, formal mistakes or procedural failures in holding 
the meeting may affect the validity of the meeting decision itself. The two distinct 
legal relationships under the EPV-model (agency / corporate) may assist in reducing 
the risk that technological errors52 affect the validity of the meeting decision.53 
                                            
51 If the shareholder’s representative, however, is an agent, the management or a director of the 
corporation, corporate and securities laws regulate the mandatory content of information provided 
to the shareholder, as well as the content and design of the form of proxy, in order to mitigate 
potential conflicts of interests and the risk of fraud. On details, see Zetzsche, “Shareholder 
Interaction”, supra note 4, at III 3, with further references. The Canada and the U.S. even impose 
extensive mandatory requirements on proxies solicited by dissidents, which is due to an extensive 
interpretation of the capital markets-oriented disclosure approach. 
52 The firms frequently fear hacker attacks. 
53 The statement that this formal distinction, in fact, reduces risk is contentious. See, for Germany, e.g. 
Pikò/Preissler, in Zetzsche, Virtual Shareholder Meeting, supra note 2, No. 365 et seq.; Zetzsche, 
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Second. EDV requires an expansion of the meaning of the expression “meeting” from 
a traditional physical understanding to an understanding that regards the internet-
attendant (who is physically an absentee) as “present” in the meeting. The prevailing 
opinion in Germany, the UK and Switzerland54 suspects that this understanding is 
beyond the limits of the statutory definition of “meeting”. A hint in the opposite 
direction, however, might be found in the British Department of Trade and Industry’s 
statement in its new Draft Bill that there is no need for new regulation in this area, 
because market practice and case law will continue to evolve.55
Some jurisdictions, however, have mastered the methodological challenges provided 
by more dispersed forms of a “meeting”. For example, the by-laws of a French SA 
may provide that 
shareholders participating in a meeting by video-conferencing or means of 
telecommunication that enable them to be identified […] shall be deemed to be present at 
the said meeting for the purposes of calculating the quorum and majority.56
It further contains provisions regarding the necessary technical features and 
procedural arrangements for such meetings.57 The French law nevertheless requires 
                                                                                                                                        
supra note 2, BKR 2003, 736, 740: distinction equivalent to sphere of influence. For Switzerland: 
Hans-Peter Schaad, in: Basler Kommentar zum Schweizerischen Privatrecht, 2. Aufl. 2002, Art. 
689b OR No. 23 (lower risk); Von der Crone, supra note 2, at 161 (no lower risk). 
54 Germany: e.g. Uwe Hüffer, Aktiengesetz (transl. Commentary to the Aktiengesetz), 6th edn, Beck, 
München: 2005, § 118 Rn. 17 [Hüffer]; UK: Boros, “CG in Cyberspace”, supra note 2, at 156-164 
(unclear with respect to her own opinion); Switzerland: Von der Crone, “Internet-
Generalversammlung”, supra note 2, at 161. 
55 DTI, White Paper (March 2005), supra note 6, at 32. 
56 Art. L225-107 (II) C.com. 
57 Art. 145-2 Decree: "The video-conferencing means […] must satisfy technical features in order to 
guarantee the actual participation in the meeting, if the proceedings are continuously broadcast.” 
Art. 145-3 Decree: "Shareholders exercising their votes during the meeting by electronic means in 
the manner provided for under Article 119 may access the site dedicated for such purpose only 
after providing identification, by means of a code issued prior to the meeting". Art. 145-4 Decree: 
- 25 - 
each shareholder to ask in writing that the company send him an absentee ballot. 
Then, the company may send the absentee ballot per email, if appropriate.58 The 
Canadian approach is more liberal: 
Unless the by-laws otherwise provide, any person entitled to attend a meeting of 
shareholders may participate in the meeting, in accordance with the regulations, if any, by 
means of a telephonic, electronic or other communication facility that permits all 
participants to communicate adequately with each other during the meeting, if the 
corporation makes available such a communication facility. A person participating in a 
meeting by such means is deemed for the purposes of this Act to be present at the 
meeting.59  
The DelGCL allows stockholder meetings to be held entirely by remote 
communication, without a venue for physical attendance, if so determined by the 
board of directors in its sole discretion. This discretion is subject to the requirement 
that the corporation implements (i) verification procedures, (ii) measures to ensure 
that all stockholders have an opportunity to participate in the meeting and vote, and 
(iii) means to record the votes of such stockholders: 
If authorized by the board of directors in its sole discretion […] stockholders and 
proxyholders not physically present at a meeting of stockholders may, by means of 
remote communication: a. Participate in a meeting of stockholders; and b. Be deemed 
present in person and vote at a meeting of stockholders, whether such meeting is to be 
held at a designated place or solely by means of remote communication.60  
                                                                                                                                        
"The minutes of meeting's proceedings referred to in Art. 149 [of the Decree] must report any 
occurrence of technical hitches in relation with video-conferencing or electronic communications in 
the case the occurrence disrupted the meeting.” 
58 Michel Storck,  "Corporate Governance à la Francaise – Current Trends" ECFR 2004, 37, 53. 
59 S. 132 (4) CBCA. 
60 S. 211 (a) (2) DelGCL, subject to the following requirements: (i) the corporation shall implement 
reasonable measures to verify that each person deemed present and permitted to vote at the 
meeting by means of remote communication is a stockholder or proxyholder, (ii) the corporation 
shall implement reasonable measures to provide such stockholders and proxyholders a reasonable 
opportunity to participate in the meeting and to vote on matters submitted to the stockholders, 
including an opportunity to read or hear the proceedings of the meeting substantially concurrently 
with such proceedings, and (iii) if any stockholder or proxyholder votes or takes other action at the 
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c) Virtual Shareholder Meetings [VSMs] 
While both EPV and EDV are “add-ons” to a physical shareholder meeting, a virtual 
shareholder meeting does not take place at any physical place. Rather, it takes place 
in “the web” – wherever this is. Shareholders would not be able to attend the meeting 
physically. There are two types of virtual shareholder meetings.  
Under the first type, which is common across the jurisdictions for closed corporations, 
shareholders may resolve on an issue without a physical meeting taking place. This 
type of decision-making assumes that shareholders in closed corporations will 
communicate independently among one and other and make decisions without 
management necessarily being involved in the decision-making process. This type of 
decision-making is often permitted by a statute declaring written resolutions of 
shareholders to substitute for traditional shareholder meetings,61 with the “written 
resolution” also being a resolution that documents shareholder consent by electronic 
means.62 Only in Delaware can shareholders of public corporations substitute for 
meetings with written shareholder consent.63 Even there, this provision is usually 
waived in the certificate of incorporation (interestingly, due to concerns that such a 
                                                                                                                                        
meeting by means of remote communication, a record of such vote or other action shall be 
maintained by the corporation. 
61 The Delaware and future British law a decision in which the majority of voting rights entitled to vote 
at the meeting participates may substitute for the meeting itself [s. 228 (a) DelGCL; ss. D7 et seq. 
UK Draft Bill (excluding resolutions removing directors and auditors)]; the other laws require either 
a written resolution signed by all the shareholders entitled to vote on that resolution [RMBCA § 7.04 
(a), (c), but see (d); Canada: ss. 142 CBCA; UK: s. 366 A (1) CA 1985] or all shareholders or all 
shareholders’ consent to decide in written form [Germany: s. 121 (6) AktG, s. 48 (2) GmbHG]. 
62 UK: S. D14 (2) UK Draft Bill; U.S.: s. 228 (d) DelGCL. 
63 Requiring consent by the majority of all shares entitled to vote on the meeting. This threshold is 
likely to be more difficult to reach than a majority of shareholders present at a meeting. 
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provision may benefit insurgents in a control contest!).64 Consequently, this 
alternative will not be considered in the following section. 
Under the second model – the truly Virtual Shareholder Meeting [VSM] - the physical 
meeting is replaced by a web-based procedure. Shareholders and directors 
deliberate and communicate specifically and exclusively through the web. With 
respect to quoted corporations, VSMs are only permitted in Canada and the U.S. The 
CBCA states: 
If the directors or the shareholders of a corporation call a meeting of shareholders 
pursuant to this Act, those directors or shareholders, as the case may be, may determine 
that the meeting shall be held, in accordance with the regulations, if any, entirely by 
means of a telephonic, electronic or other communication facility that permits all 
participants to communicate adequately with each other during the meeting, if the by-laws 
so provide.65  
The DelGCL stipulates: 
If […] the board of directors is authorized to determine the place of a meeting of 
stockholders, the board of directors may, in its sole discretion, determine that the meeting 
shall not be held at any place, but may instead be held solely by means of remote 
communication as authorized by paragraph (a)(2) of this section.66  
                                            
64 David A. Drexler, Lewis S. Black, Jr. & A. Gilchrist Sparks, III, Del. Corp. Law and Practice § 31.01, 
at 2-31 (2003); Charles R. T. O`Kelley & Robert B. Thompson, Corporations and Other Business 
Associations: Cases and Materials (Aspen, 4th ed. 2003), at 151. 
65 S. 132 (5) CBCA. 
66 S. 211 (a) (1) sent. 2, Title 8 DelGCL. 
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Table 3: Electronic Voting 
Jurisdiction Electronic Proxy Voting Electronic Direct Voting Virtual Shareholder 
Meeting 
Canada67 Permitted  Unless by-laws otherwise 
provide & if corporation 
makes available such a 
communication facility. 
If the by-laws so provide 
France68 Permitted  If the by-laws so provide - 
Germany69 Vis-à-vis company: if the by-laws 
so provide or if shareholder uses 
qualified digital signature /  
Vis-à-vis intermediary: permitted 
Not permitted  
(prevailing view) 
- 
Switzerland70 Written proxy or electronic proxy 
signed with a qualified digital 
signature; electronic directions to 
proxy subject to managerial 
discretion 
Not permitted  
(prevailing view) 
- 
UK71 CA 1985: permitted, unless 
articles provide otherwise & 
where this is provided for in 
notice / electronic communication  
or instrument of proxy sent out by 
the company; 
 
UK Draft Bill (2005): permitted, if 
company provides for electronic 
address in proxy statement 
Case law unclear;  
legislature passive 
- 
U.S.72  E-Sign Act: permitted (cont.); 
DelGCL: subject to managerial 
discretion; RMBCA: permitted  
DelGCL: subject to 
managerial discretion; 
RMBCA: not permitted 
DelGCL: if board is 
authorized to determine 
place of meeting: subject 
to managerial discretion; 
RMBCA: not permitted 
                                            
67 EPV: argumentum ex No. 54 (9) CBC Regulations; EDV: ss. 132 (4), (5) & 141 (3), (4) CBCA and 
No. 45 CBC Regulations. 
68 EPV: Art. 225.106 C.Com & Artt. 131 – 134 Decree; EDV: Art. L225.107 (II) C.com, and Art. 119 
Decree  & Artt. 131 – 134 Decree. 
69 EPV: Ss. 134 (3) 1, 135 (2) 3, (4) AktG and ss. 126 (3), 126a BGB; against EDV: prevailing opinion, 
e.g. Hüffer, supra note 54, § 118 Rn. 12; against VSM: argumentum ex ss. 118 (1), 121 (3), (5) 
AktG. 
70 Art. 689a OR and Art. 14 (2bis), in force since January 1st, 2005; Von der Crone, “Internet-
Generalversammlung”, supra note 2, at 160 et seq., holds that EPV is nevertheless legitimate. 
71 EPV: S. 372 (2A) – (2B), (6A) CA 1985, No. 60-63 of Table A; ss. D50 (2), (3) and Schedule F1, Pt. 
3 No. 6, 7 UK Draft Bill (2005); EDV & VSM: see Boros, “CG in Cyberspace”, supra note 2, at 155 
et seq.  
72 EPV: Ss. 212 (c) DelGCL; § 7.22 RMBCA; EDV & VSM: s. 211 (a), (e) DelGCL. 
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3. Communication 
The information methods described so far herein are one-way methods. Efficient 
information, in contrast, requires communication with regard to its content, hence the 
mutual exchange of ideas and facts in which both sides approach the “truth” in an act 
of togetherness. The famous Swiss corporate law scholar Jean Nicolas Druey 
compared this process with the legendary Native-American way to deliberate, the 
powwow.73 Few provisions undertake to achieve an online powwow. 
a) Management as Addressee: Q & A 
Besides shareholder meetings, the privilege to ask management questions 
personally is reserved for controlling and institutional shareholders. Only a few laws 
undertake to transfer the Q & A sessions into the web-forum.  
Outside of analyst / investor and shareholder meetings, North-American corporations 
typically refrain from answering investors’ questions, while European standards 
understand frequent contacts between management and shareholders in between 
the meetings to be part of good governance.74 To justify this restrictive practice, U.S. 
corporations refer to capital market laws that require that equal information be given 
to all investors.75 This does not, however, explain why corporations do not offer web-
based question and answer sessions, e.g. through a moderated chat-board with 
                                            
73 Jean Nicolas Druey, Information als Gegenstand des Rechts (transl. Information as substance of 
law) (Zürich, Baden-Baden: 1995), at 190. 
74 F.e. the Swiss Code of Best Practice for Corporate Governance (at I.8.) states: “The Board of 
Directors should inform shareholders on the progress of the company also during the course of the 
financial year. The Baord of Directors should appoint a position for shareholders relations. In the 
dissemination of information, the statutory principle of equal treatment should be respected.” 
75 F.e.: U.S.: Regulation Fair Disclosure (F-D). 
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management. Presumably, they refuse to hold such sessions because they would be 
an inconvenience to management and would not provide a significant benefit to the 
important investors – the controlling and institutional shareholders. 
Such an argument, however, does not explain why, with respect to shareholder 
meetings, efficient large-scale Q&A-sessions over the web have not been utilized. 
While we see the meeting itself being webcasted all around the world,76 a procedure 
enabling shareholders to ask questions via webcam seems still unlikely for public 
corporations even though it is legally77 and technically feasible. The few examples of 
web-based Q&A-sessions78 are statistically irrelevant. Email question & answer tools 
do not seem to be widely accepted by shareholders, which is partly due to the fact 
that shareholders need a proxy who is willing to read the questions asked,79 and 
partly due to the fact that it is boring to sit in front of the screen and wait for 
management to answer the one question that the shareholder asked. The boredom 
increases proportionately with the length of the meeting. In Germany, where 
shareholder meetings frequently take 6 hours or more, the aforementioned model is 
out of touch with the reality of shareholder meetings. 
                                            
76 E.g., for the U.S. Friedman, supra note 2, at ¶11-40 et seq.  
77 E.g. ss. 132 (4) & 132 (5) CBCA require “adequate methods of electronic communication” to 
meeting participants as a precondition for the use of the internet which is commonly understood to 
be fulfilled if management enables shareholders to send emails to management that answers them 
by talking to the physically present audience, being transmitted to the virtually present 
shareholders. The same criterion stipulates the DelGCL, s. 211 (a) DelGCL. Under the proxy 
models typically used in Europe, the proxy is theoretically entitled to ask questions (some 
exceptions apply to the current British law), though he rarely does so.  
78 Friedman, supra note 2, at ¶11.41 et seq. (2004 supplement) summarizes the experiences of U.S. 
firms. 
79 See below. 
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Thus, the German government is looking for alternatives. It recently proposed a 
provision which has the potential to increase the incentives to enter into a digital 
dialogue and mitigate the information problems of retail shareholders both inside and 
outside of shareholder meetings. Pursuant to this provision, information that is 
published on the corporate website may not be the subject of Q&A in the shareholder 
meeting.80 On the one hand, this provision is intended to reduce the exposure of 
German companies to nuisance-claims based on failures to adequately answer 
shareholder questions within the strict timeframe of shareholder meetings.81 On the 
other hand, the proposal opens the gate for efficient, all-year long virtual Q&A-
sessions. Given a well-organized Question & Answer catalogue on the corporate 
website (in addition to regular disclosure), supplemented by a corporate-sponsored 
chat-board, there will be few questions left to ask for during the shareholder meeting. 
This “permanent” investor / shareholder information suggests the future path of 
internet-based exercise of shareholder rights which will be considered below. 
Finally, the European Commission is furthering electronic communication among 
management and shareholders. Under the current proposal for a shareholder rights 
directive, “[s]hareholders shall have the right to ask questions at least in writing 
ahead of the General Meeting and obtain responses to their questions. Responses to 
shareholders’ questions in General Meetings shall be made available to all 
shareholders.”82 While I criticize the formal requirement (“in writing”), and the fact that 
only questions being asked in shareholder meetings shall be made available to all 
                                            
80 S. 131 (7) AktG, as introduced by UMAG, supra note 6. 
81 On details, see Noack/Zetzsche, “Corporate Governance Reform in Germany”, supra note 8. 
82  
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shareholders (on the firm’s website) – this distinction is subject to concerns with 
respect to equal information for all investors -, the proposal generally tends into the 
right direction, which is replicating the communication function into the web-era. 
b) Management as Information Intermediary 
Some provisions utilize the corporation as an information intermediary, and as a 
respondent at the same time. Shareholder petitions are typically distributed through 
(at least) the corporation as an information intermediary that forwards the petition into 
the notice of the meeting or the proxy statement, respectively.83 If this is the case, the 
internet merely fulfills the function of a digital rather than postal messenger.  
The information intermediation by the corporation, however, has some flaws from the 
shareholder perspective. This is because management learns about the requisition at 
the same time that the requisition is supplied to the corporation. In this very moment, 
management may consider its value, prepare an appropriate answer and begin 
lobbying for its own position. All these actions will be paid out of the corporation’s 
pockets, hence, by the shareholders. Thus, management has a strategic advantage 
which may hamper the efficiency of shareholder activism in contentious situations.84 
This situation is neither new, nor does it specifically arise from the use of the internet. 
Even in the digital age, the strategic advantage of management functioning as an 
information intermediary remains. 
c) Management as opponent 
                                            
83 On details, see Zetzsche, “Shareholder Interaction”, supra note 4, at III 3. Exceptions apply to proxy 
fights with regard to director elections under North American laws. 
84 On details, see Zetzsche, “Shareholder Interaction”, supra note 4, at III 3. 
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The web has the potential, however, to facilitate direct shareholder-to-shareholder 
communication, hence communication independent from the management as an 
information intermediary. This type of communication may become crucial if 
management is opposed to a shareholder petition. For example, the North American 
proxy regulations, which rigidly limit shareholder communication that involves seeking 
the authority to exercise voting rights on behalf of other shareholders,85 clarify that 
the definition of proxy solicitation does not extend to  
a public announcement […] by a shareholder of how the shareholder intends to vote and 
the reasons for that decision [that is made by] a press release, an opinion, a statement or 
an advertisement provided through a broadcast medium or by a telephonic, electronic or 
other communication facility, or appearing in a newspaper, a magazine or other 
publication generally available to the public.86  
Under these provisions, shareholders can (1) discuss management proposals, (2) 
lobby for their own position with respect to certain polls moved at the meeting (in so 
called “vote no campaigns”), and (3) disclose how they intend to vote and their 
reasons, publicly on the internet. However, if shareholders together holding 5% or 
more of the voting rights agree on a voting strategy they will run the risk of being 
deemed to be a group of shareholders for the purposes of s. 13d of the U.S. 
                                            
85 If a petitioner seeks to solicit proxies over the internet, s. 150 (1.2) CBCA & No. 69 CBC regulations 
set more burdensome requirements with respect to the content of the internet publication. The U.S. 
law [Rule 14a-3(f)] requires the filing of a definitive proxy statement before a petitioner lobbies for 
his position over the internet. Even then, he must not provide a form of proxy or means to execute 
the same in connection with the communication. 
86 Cited from S. 147 (b) (v) CBCA & No. 67 (b) CBC regulations. The U.S. federal regulations contains 
a similar exception in Rules 14a-1(l)(iv) (exclusion from the definition of “solicitation”) and 14a-
2(b)(1). 
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Securities Exchange Act.87 If this is the case, a costly disclosure statement and filing 
requirement is triggered.88  
The Canadian law is less cumbersome than the U.S. law,89 in that it allows 
shareholders to pool shares with other shareholders to meet the minimum threshold 
required for certain minority rights.90 Over the internet, which is the most popular, 
most accessible and the least expensive mass media, the petitioner might indirectly 
gain significant support, without having to file a proxy statement. However, 
shareholders might experience problems in trying to find the websites of other 
shareholders who support shareholder activity. This is particularly difficult when the 
company is in the news on a regular basis and internet-search engines and RSS 
feed deliver an excessive number of hits. Alternatively, shareholders may create 
advertisements urging shareholders to access the specific website.91 However, due 
to the costs imposed on shareholders, this kind of behavior is rare outside the 
context of takeover battles. 
                                            
87 Stating: “When two or more persons agree to act  together for the purpose of … voting … of equity 
securities of an issuer, the group formed thereby shall be deemed to have acquired beneficial 
ownership … as of the date of such agreement …” For details, see Friedman, supra note 2, at ¶12-
09 et seq. 
88 In the absence of takeover attempts, the other jurisdictions in the purview of this study refrain from 
imposing disclosure duties on concerted shareholder actions if shareholders co-ordinate the 
exercise of voting rights in the absence of a board control seeking proposal. See, for example, with 
respect to the UK, see Simon P. Allport, Leon Ferera, “Shareholder Activism: Takeover Code 
Consequences” (7/2003), online: http://www1.jonesday.com/pubs/detail.asap?language= 
English&pubid=898 . 
89 While under Canadian law this pooling may take place over the internet, without constituting a 
“proxy solicitation”, the U.S. case law with respect to inspection rights suggests a stricter approach, 
see Studebaker Corp. vs. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1966). 
90 Canada gazette, Part I (Sept 8, 2001), at 3443; s. 147 (b) (vii) CBCA & No. 68 CBC regulations. 
91 For U.S. examples, see Friedman, supra note 2, at ¶12-05/6. 
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The laws provide solutions to the problem of identifying fellow shareholders in two 
different ways. Either, the law may grant online access to the shareholder list. 
Shareholders looking for support may be able to address fellow shareholders at 
lower costs electronically than they could under traditional methods of 
communication. This alternative choice is, for example, the Delaware legislature’s in 
the case of a meeting of stockholders held without a physical location. However, 
under Delaware law the corporation is not required to include Email addresses or 
other electronic contact information in the shareholder list, which hampers the 
efficiency of the method from the outset.92 Furthermore, many shareholders would 
not like to respond to shareholder activists’ emails. Finally, regardless of the 
availability of digital communication, it is nevertheless costly to retrieve and 
administer the data for sending statements to many shareholders.  
Alternatively, the law may determine an easily accessible online address where 
shareholders can announce their wish to gather support for their activities, and fellow 
shareholders can join them. The German government chose this alternative. The 
UMAG-proposal issued by the German government introduces a specific section for 
shareholder co-ordination in the Federal Electronic Bulletin.93 For minority rights that 
are contingent on a threshold, a shareholder can send his issue and a contact 
address and a link to the editor of the Federal Electronic Bulletin, who will in turn 
publish it in a specifically designated section (at very low costs). Other shareholders 
can access the special section by electronic means free of cost. The exercise of this 
minority right is not contingent on the strict timeframe of traditional shareholder 
                                            
92 S. 219 (a) DelGCL. 
93 S. 127a AktG, as introduced by UMAG, supra note 6, Art.1 No.6. On details, see Noack/Zetzsche, 
“Corporate Governance Reform in Germany”, supra note 8, at III.2.a). 
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meetings. It may trigger all-year long shareholder communication and help to inspire 
shareholder activism.  
The counter-proposal right of German shareholders fulfills an equivalent function with 
regard to topics that are announced to become an item on the meeting’s agenda.94 
Shareholders may mention to all shareholders their willingness to propose a different 
position with respect to an agenda topic, and ask other shareholders to support them. 
The right may be exercised up to 2 weeks before the meeting. Since 2002, 
management is required to publish the counter-proposal on the corporate website 
within the section provided for shareholder meeting-related information at a place 
that shareholders can easily find. Corporate laws of other jurisdictions often require 
management to distribute counter-proposals to all shareholders, but usually with a 
less generous space- and timeframe as compared to the German law.95
4. Review 
Finally, among the jurisdictions analyzed herein, only the German law deals with the 
review function of shareholder meetings. The scarcity of digital replications of the 
review function is probably due to the fact that review is generally considered to be 
an in camera act that should not take place in the public sphere that the internet 
provides. The German legislature nevertheless intends to utilize the potential of the 
net by enabling shareholders to call for support, therefore utilizing the 
aforementioned special section in the Federal Electronic Bulletin,96 with two effects. 
First; shareholders may assemble a quorum threshold which is necessary under 
                                            
94 Ss. 126, 127 AktG. 
95 See Zetzsche, “Shareholder interaction”, supra note 4. 
96 Supra note 93. 
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German law for a special investigation by an auditor on behalf of the shareholders, 
for requiring the supervisory board to sue the board of management, and for certain 
derivative actions.97 Second, shareholders willing to support the action may agree on 
sharing the litigation costs, which mitigates collective action problems. While in the 
U.S. the bundling-function that this website fulfills is typically exercised by lawyers 
chasing clients via commercials and web-advertisements, the use of the internet may 
help to avoid the excesses that are commonly associated with lawyer-driven 
corporate monitoring.98 The current proposal, however, prohibits shareholders from 
using the website section for assembling support for securities class actions and 
actions directed against the validity of a shareholder-meeting decision, the type of 
shareholder actions most often used in Germany. 
IV. Reducing Shareholder Apathy 
Thus, while all jurisdictions have undertaken some activities in order to support 
internet-based exercise of shareholder rights, few have undertaken to replicate the 
four functions of traditional shareholder meetings through web-based procedures; 
none has fully taken the step into the digital age. Is this observation surprising?  
                                            
97 Ss. 142, 147, 148 AktG (UMAG). 
98 Roberta Romano, “The Shareholder Suit: Litigation without Foundation?” (1991) J.L. Econ. & Org. 7, 
55, at 84 (1991); Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, “The New Look of Shareholder 
Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions”, (2004) Vand. L.R. 57, forthcoming, (from SSRN). 
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1. The Cause of Inefficient Shareholder Participation 
In order to answer this question, it is useful to recall the well-documented99 problems 
associated with traditional shareholder meetings. Efficient voting is commonly said to 
be hampered by the high costs of exercising shareholder rights (as compared to the 
less costly alternative of selling), collective action problems, and limited shareholder 
influence on certain subject matters. The situation in which shareholders find 
themselves has been termed picturesquely as the shareholders’ “rational apathy”.100 
It is one of the driving forces behind the “Wallstreet Rule” – the traditional approach 
of institutional investors to either vote with management, or sell (earlier than other 
shareholders!).  
a) Costs of Exercising Shareholder Rights 
Exercising shareholder rights is costly to investors: Getting and evaluating 
information is costly, since it requires time and money to research, read and 
process the information. The same is true with respect to communication: in 
addition to the time and money which shareholders need to invest for the purpose of 
communication itself (of which probably the oldest method is the assembly at one 
                                            
99 The basic piece is Adolf A. Berle & Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property, first ed. 1933, revised ed. (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1968) [Berle & 
Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1933)], at 64-65, and 244 et seq. More 
recent works include e.g. Earl Latham, “The Commonwealth of the Corporation” (1960) Nw. U.L.R. 
55, 25; Clark, Corporate Law (1986), at 390; Henry G. Manne, “Some Theoretical Aspects of Share 
Voting – An Essay in Honor of Adolf A. Berle”, (1964) 64 Colum. L.R. 1427, at 1437, at 1438; 
Bayless Manning, “Book Review”, (1958) Yale L.J. 67, 1477, 1485-1496; Robert Charles Clark, 
Corporate Law (Little, Brown and Company, Boston Toronto 1986) [Clark, Corporate Law], at 390 
et seq.; Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law 
(Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA: 1991), at 84; Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, 
in: Kraakman et al. (eds.), The Anatomy of Corporate Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2004), 
at 46 [Kraakman et al., “The Anatomy of Corporate Law”]; Siems, Convergence, supra note 3, at 
§3. Specifically with respect to the gathering of information: Joseph E. Calio & Rafael X. 
Zahralddin, “The Securities and Exchange Commission's 1992 Proxy Amendments: Questions of 
Accountability,” 14 Pace L. Rev . 459, 521-23 (1994). 
100 Clark, Corporate Law , supra note 99, at 390 et seq.  
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meeting location), it is costly to find out who else holds shares in the company and 
who is willing to communicate. Voting is costly, as well, because it requires time to 
decide upon one’s voting strategy and to issue the vote on a ballot or a proxy form 
itself. Finally, prompting reviews is costly because – in addition to the time invested - 
it usually requires the establishment of a certain threshold, consisting of either a 
minimum number of shareholders / shares, or a minimum content requirement, such 
as establishing “reasonable doubt” as to the legitimacy of management’s activity that 
is challenged. These procedures are typically accompanied with lawyer and court 
fees. Therefore, the individual shareholder’s desire to participate in the governance 
of the company is obviously mitigated. 
b) Collective Action Problems 
As a result of these high costs for investors, one derives the prevailing opinion that 
voting may often result in poor decisions since small shareholders have little 
incentive to inform themselves appropriately before they make a decision. This 
understanding is based on two observations. First, why should shareholders invest in 
activities that are likely to be undertaken by other shareholders with a greater interest 
(share) in the firm’s well-being? The higher the costs and the smaller one’s own 
share, the greater the incentives to engage in free-riding on other’s activities. 
Consequently, only shareholders with significant shares in the firm strive for informed 
voting.  
Second, even if some altruistic shareholders are willing to engage in informed 
communication and voting, their influence on the company is limited by the 
amount of votes they hold. Unless they are controlling shareholders, they need the 
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co-operation of other shareholders to succeed in a contentious vote. Rallying support 
for one’s proposal is costly, with expenses frequently exceeding a million dollars.101 
Given the uncertain outcome of these activities, it is perfectly reasonable that 
shareholders abstain from investing in activism altogether, and choose the certain, 
and probably less costly, alternative of selling the shares if negative information is 
disclosed.  
c) Legally Limited Shareholder Influence 
Because voting imposes high process costs not only on investors, but also on the 
firm itself, and the outcome of voting is unclear, another barrier arises - legally limited 
shareholder influence. In addition to the ordinary business exclusion re shareholder 
proposals for public corporations,102 some jurisdictions limit shareholder influence by 
raising procedural barriers with respect to certain subject matters or restricting 
shareholder influence on the content of certain corporate documents.103 In two-tier 
jurisdictions, management may also be shielded from shareholder influence by the 
existence of a supervisory board.104  
This paper addresses only one procedural aspect to the still ongoing105 discussion re 
the enhancement of substantive shareholder rights. If shareholders exercise their 
                                            
101 See Zetzsche, “Shareholder Interaction”, supra note 4, with further references. 
102 Against the American exclusionary right Kevin W. Waite, “The Ordinary Business Operations 
Exception to the Shareholder Proposal Rule: A Return to Predictability,” 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1253 
(1995). 
103 Such as the lack of American shareholders to initiate mergers and charter amendments, see Henry 
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, in: Kraakman et al. (eds.), The Anatomy of Corporate Law (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford: 2004), at 47; with respect to the procedural hurdles re director elections, 
see Zetzsche, “Shareholder Interaction”, supra note 4, at III.2.d). 
104 This, at least, is the interpretation of the two –tier board system by Hansmann & Kraakman, ibid. 
105 See, e.g. Lucian A. Bebchuck, ”The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power”, (2005) Harv. L.R. 
118:3, 836. 
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power merely once a year (due to costs and lack of expertise), shareholder influence 
on management is necessarily weak. If management organizes the meeting and 
controls the voting procedure it is unlikely that management will implement 
shareholder friendly rules,106 for two reasons. First, the change to efficient voting 
deprives the beneficiaries of the current voting regime, presumably large and 
institutional shareholders, of their private benefits of control. These shareholder 
groups who currently dominate the voting process are unlikely to support change. 
Second, shareholder decisions upon management’s re-election are only influenced to 
a minor extent by the fact that management organizes the shareholder meeting. The 
shareholders’ prime focus is on the management of the firm’s business. 
Shareholders opposing a specific meeting procedure face a bundling problem when 
pressuring against management. Unless procedure becomes the prevailing concern 
– such as during takeover contests - this bundling problem reduces shareholder 
influence in general. I will return to both aspects shortly. 
2. A Better State: Shareholder Influence through Electronic 
Means 
a) Co-relation of Costs and Shareholder Activity 
Electronic communication and the multi-input / -output structure of the internet have 
the potential to reduce the above disincentives. This is due to the fact that the impact 
of these disincentives on shareholder activism increases proportionally with the costs 
associated with shareholder activism. To the same extent that information, 
communication, voting, and review become less expensive, we should expect 
shareholder activism to rise.  
                                            
106 For examples, see below IV.3.a). 
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Gathering information is less costly, since web-based search engines enable 
access to any web-stored data around the globe. Furthermore, in times of RSS-feed 
technologies, information intermediaries (if they only intermediate information!) 
become useless, given that shareholders will receive any information they specified 
in RSS even without extensive research. Evaluating information is cheaper as well 
since (1) Extensible Reporting Business Language (XBRL) enables data-processing 
through standardized evaluation tools, and (2) webusers may achieve feedback from 
professionals and amateurs at relatively low costs due to enhanced economies of 
scale and lower transaction costs in the market for the evaluation of information. 
Expertise that is commercially and technically available through the internet 
substitutes for the lack of the shareholder’s intellectual capabilities. Admittedly, the 
quality of this expertise may become an issue, though not more (and, due to easy 
digital access to quality probes and responses by other users, likely even less) 
severely than in the ancient times of print-only media.  
Communication is less costly and more transparent if exercised over the net, 
through emails, chat-boards, internet-based audio/video-conferencing systems, 
internet-notices, announcements, call for supports etc. Voting requires fewer efforts, 
given the existence of already common e-voting systems, and the fact that 
shareholders can rely on voting recommendations by other shareholders or proxy 
voting services that are accessible through the net, or even better the voting platform 
provided by the company.107 Still an issue is the digital authentication of 
shareholders, but we are positive that this issue will be settled, as e-signatures, 
                                            
107 This is an “old” demand by Theodor Baums & Phillip von Randow, “Shareholder Voting and 
Corporate Governance: The German Experience and a New Approach,” in: M. Aoki/H.K. Kim (eds), 
Corporate Governance in Transitional Economies. EDI Development Studies (The World Bank, 
Washington D.C.: 1995) 435, 451 et seq., and Mark Latham, supra note 2. Some U.S. companies 
were forced to put such a proposal on the agenda in 2004, see Friedman, supra note 2, at ¶ 11.07. 
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smart cards, etc. become more widely used. With respect to review, the internet 
facilitates both the meeting of the (content-based or formal) threshold requirement, 
and the review itself. The former is facilitated through easier access to other 
shareholders and information, as described above. The latter is facilitated through 
easier access to peer-data etc. If, for example, co-ordination among shareholders is 
highly efficient it may even substitute for the review itself: which management would 
like to resist an application supported by a clear majority of shareholders? Even 
more, efficient voting mechanisms could, in theory, achieve the monitoring efficiency 
of controlling shareholders without their downside, which is the private benefits of 
control.108
Empirically, the aspect of increasing shareholder activity through the spread of web-
based technologies has not been sufficiently researched and few data are available. 
The data that are available are yet incomplete and they do not allow for a distinction 
between the impact of web-based technologies, and other factors that cause greater 
shareholder concerns, like the sobriety among investors in the aftermath of the tech-
bubble. The data nevertheless suggest that more and more small shareholders 
exercise their voting rights or participate in shareholder meetings.109 This observation 
is, at least, consistent with the logical arguments stated above. 
Despite all this optimism, it must be clear that some costs will remain. For example, 
investors may have lower research and information-gathering costs, but evaluating 
                                            
108 See, for example, Craig Dodge, “U.S. Cross-listings and the private benefits of control: evidence 
from dual-class firms” (2004) J. Fin. Econ. 72, 519, with further references. 
109 See, e.g., Van Der Elst, “Attendance of Shareholders and the Impact of Regulatory Corporate 
Governance Reforms”, supra note 18; Zetzsche, “Explicit and Implicit System”, supra note 4; for 
UK (*) is reported that attendance rates at large UK companes went up in recent years from app. 
28% to 46%, for uncertain reasons. 
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information still requires some shareholder investment. Identifying fellow 
shareholders will be less costly, but some costs of campaigning for one’s dissident 
proposal will remain. Voting itself may be significantly cheaper, but making good 
decisions upon the issues at stake will remain costly. A review that is supported by 
many shareholders may be less expensive, but it will nevertheless require substantial 
investment. 
b) Voting vs. Trading 
This should, however, not induce our optimism to vanish, given that we do not need a 
costless voting decision. Instead, the costs of voting must merely be as low as the 
costs of selling. And, compared to the costs of selling, web-based voting appears 
promising for the following reasons. First, an informed buy-/sell decision also requires 
the shareholders to gather and evaluate information. Thus, with regard to the buy-
/sell versus voting comparison, information expenses are neutral. In fact, selling 
possibly imposes higher information costs than voting because the investor does not 
only need to process the information with regard to the firm in which he has invested, 
but also with regard to investment alternatives (where do I invest my money now?). 
Thus, given that all other costs are equal, shareholders should be expected to vote, 
rather than sell.110 Second, buying/ selling shares is costly in and of itself. The 
transaction costs for selling typically increase in proportion to the amount of invested 
money. Hence, given that all other costs are equal, large investors should be biased 
towards voting rather than selling. Risk assessment issues and the problem of 
dispersed control upon management, however, remain a perennial issue. Thus 
voting, even if efficiently organized, still imposes some costs, particularly on less 
                                            
110 This consideration is consistent with behavioral finance works that show a tendency of investors to 
stick to investments.  
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influential investors, that selling does not. There is nevertheless reason for optimism 
that further reforms of procedural rules may bring the transaction costs of voting to a 
level that is below the transaction costs of selling, and the overall costs to a level that 
is more attractive for the individual investor than it is currently. 
This is particularly true when, from the investors’ perspective, trading and voting 
systems effectively merge. While it is unlikely that we see Mark Latham’s model for 
integrating online voting with Quicken to be realized,111 it might happen that brokers / 
banks / intermediaries add an “authenticate” – or more service-friendly – a “voting” / 
“question” / “communicate” (proposal) / “review” -button to the investors’ financial 
account website. Clicking on one of these buttons will automatically prompt any 
action required for the exercise of the specific shareholder rights. From a practical 
point of view, however, the merger of buy-/sell systems and voting platforms requires 
that the entities running these systems have incentives to offer voting as an 
alternative to selling. Currently, this is not the case. The jurisdictions examined herein 
require corporations to reimburse intermediaries for forwarding information (proxy 
statements etc.) to shareholders, but not for forwarding authentication and votes, 
questions etc. to the companies. If intermediaries would earn a (small) fee for each 
exercise of shareholder rights forwarded to the corporation, financial institutions 
would have an incentive to facilitate the exercise of these rights to the same extent 
as they currently facilitate trading. Then, shareholders managing their accounts 
would truly have the choice between exit or voice.  
c) Some Concerns 
                                            
111 Mark Latham, supra note 2.  
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The above sections suggest a rise in efficiency with regard to shareholder activity if 
shareholder meetings are transferred to the internet. Some commentators, however, 
are critical of a web-based shareholder meeting. While the previously raised 
concerns regarding data integrity have ceased to be heard as electronic media 
become more and more common in day-to-day business,112 it is now argued that a 
truly virtual shareholder meeting would not provide for sufficient opportunities for 
informed interactions between the participants, and would negatively affect the 
deliberation function of shareholder meetings. It is typically agreed among these 
authors who emphasize the importance of the ability of the participants to fully 
present their cases and monitor the reactions and cases of others that virtual 
shareholder meetings should be given a mere “guarded welcome.”113 In the vein of 
this argument, the influential U.S. Council of Institutional Investors holds: 
Companies should hold shareholder meetings by remote communication (so-called 
electronic or “cyber”-meetings) only as a supplement to traditional in-person shareholder 
meetings, not as a substitute.114  
These admonitions may be countered in two ways. First, the ideal of deliberative 
assemblies is merely a myth. The larger the meeting and the firm, the less specific 
are the results that a meeting can achieve. “Formal annual meetings do not lend 
                                            
112 The paradigmatic case of data insecurity is the Vivendi shareholder meeting of 2002, see J. 
Harding & J. Johnson, “Vivendi to recall AGM after votes “hijacked”, Financial Times April 27th /28th, 
2002. 
113 See, e.g., Boros, supra note 2; Ralph Simmonds, “Why must we meet? Thinking about why 
shareholder meetings are required”, (2001) Company and Securities Law Journal 19, 506, 517; 
Strätling, supra note 2, at 79; for references with respect to criticism by U.S. activists see 
Friedman, supra note 2, at ¶11.08[c] (2004 supplement).  
114 Council of Institutional Investors, Corporate Governance Policies (9/2002), at “General Principles, 
B.6.”, online: http://www.cii.org/corp_governance.htm . 
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themselves to serious, informal discussion.”115 Instead, the public relations functions 
of shareholder meetings become important, which may also have a disciplining 
effect, but is due to something other than deliberation.116 By contrast, management 
hesitates to discuss problems at public shareholder meetings. Serious deliberation 
may take place among institutional and large shareholders and management, but 
hardly in a shareholder meeting that bankers, brokers, journalists, and analysts 
frequently attend117 and that competitors can access. Second, the loss of the 
deliberative character is not due to the virtuality of the meeting as such, but due to 
the specific design of virtual shareholder meetings that we currently observe. This 
perspective on virtual shareholder meetings merely emphasizes the stance that this 
analysis takes that all of the traditional functions – information, communication, 
decision-making and review – need full replication in the virtual world.  
Even then, “airing issues” may account for the insistence of some commentators on 
retaining the physical meetings. The physical meeting is required, it is said, due to 
the fact that shareholder meetings are an opportunity for retail shareholders and the 
company’s directors “to engage with each other, face to face.”118 While this 
observation is inherent proof for the public relations thesis stated above, the question 
remains whether and how the same function cannot be fulfilled by a properly 
designed virtual shareholder meeting. In light of the aim of this paper which is to 
                                            
115 See e.g. Carolyn Kay Brancato, Colin Wilde, “The Future of the Annual General Meeting”, The 
Conference Board Research Report, SR-04-02, (12_2004). Consequently, professional investors 
created alternate forums where investors and corporate management can examine critical, long-
term issues, the analyst and investor conferences. With regard to that, see below IV.3.b). 
116 Noack, “Shareholders' Meeting and the Internet”, supra note 2; Zetzsche, “Explicit and Implicit 
System”, supra note 4, at B.III.2.c). 
117 See the empirical evidence on Australia by Stephen Bottomley, supra note 18, at 31. 
118 Bottomley, supra note 18, at 51; see also Strätling, supra note 2, at 79. 
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strive for an overall advantageous state this question will be examined in the next 
section. 
3. The Reform Agenda 
a) Remove Legal and Practical Barriers 
The comparative analysis revealed some barriers to the use of electronic media. 
First, with respect to the whole procedure, any terminology suggesting a 
requirement for the physical meeting needs to be removed, or clarified insofar as it 
also includes virtual shareholder meetings. Second, the aforementioned 
presumptions in favor of paper-based communications need to be removed. This 
includes any authorization requirement that demands the shareholders’ or 
management’s consent with respect to the distribution or reception of electronic 
documents by the company. These issues need to be left up to the individual 
shareholder who decides which medium fits his needs. In practice, this will mandate 
that listed corporations offer electronic access points for information, communication 
and voting. These will consist of electronic notices of the meetings, proxy statements, 
webcasts, and voting systems. 
Some other legal influences do not seem to hamper the development of such a 
system. One such example is the legal design of absentee voting. As long as there 
is always a proxy accessible over the net who follows shareholder directions, there is 
no need for direct virtual voting. Further, there is no need to reimburse shareholders 
for costs incurred by the use of the electronic media. This is because the 
shareholders can be presumed to have the technologies that are necessary anyway, 
and the costs incurred by virtual exercise of shareholder rights are low, both in total, 
and as compared to the transaction costs of selling. 
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In addition to the legal barriers, some practical barriers hamper the efficiency of 
shareholder meetings. First, most voting systems replicate some, but not all, rights 
that shareholders have in traditional shareholder meetings. The imperfect 
harmonization is usually not due to technical or legal barriers. By contrast, it is 
reasonable to assume that management simply does not want all shareholder rights 
to be perfectly replicated, partly due to its wish to stay in control over the meeting 
procedure, and partly due to a fear of unwittingly assisting insurgents. For example, 
many voting system require that a shareholder cast an “up-or-down” vote for the 
entire slate of candidates and the management proposals. Abstentions, and 
withholding of proxy authority and votes in favor of one proposal and against another 
proposal, cannot be accommodated under some voting systems.119 Management of 
some French corporations, for example, explicitly employ financial intermediaries to 
collect proxies from some, but not all shareholders.120  Under the current British law, 
firms sometimes do not grant proxies the same legal position within the meeting that 
shareholders have. In Germany and Switzerland, minority rights, such as shareholder 
petition rights or the right to formally declare dissent against a meeting decision, 
which is the requirement for certain types of judicial review under German and Swiss 
law,121 still wait to be replicated without diminishing shareholder choice.  
                                            
119 E.g. Beske, supra note 2, at 8-9 et seq., but also true with respect to some of the voting systems 
commonly used in Germany. 
120 Typically, due to costs, management uses size criteria in order to determine, from which 
shareholders proxies will be solicited. However, this practice erects barriers to exercising voting 
rights for small shareholders. 
121 For example, s. 131 (5) AktG.  
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Another practical barrier is the yet imperfect harmonization of (information and 
deposit) intermediaries in the procedure of exercising shareholder rights, the 
details of which are beyond the scope of this paper.122  
The third, and from my point of view, the most critical aspect, is the fact that web-
casting a physical meeting does not appeal to users of online systems. In other 
words, it’s boring to sit in front of the web-cast when nothing spectacular happens. 
No one wants to watch a talk-show that is transmitted live, without any editing and 
without a talk-master efficiently managing the talk. Talk-masters emphasize certain 
topics, and disregard others in order to raise, or avoid losing, their audience. If editing 
and talk-masters didn’t exist, people would immediately switch the program, given 
the huge number of alternatives. In economic terms, the “utility” of any individual 
shareholder decreases to the same extent as his boredom increases. The same 
result occurs if the discussion in the meeting gets either too banal or too complicated. 
For a plethora of reasons, many chairmen fulfill the talk-master function 
unsatisfactorily since their main job is supervising or managing the business, not 
being an expert talk-master. In the entertainment market, information intermediaries 
(“talk-masters”) produce information in a standard that appeals to the specific user-
group. The fact that information for and out of shareholder meetings is produced by 
legal, rather than information experts adds to the boredom shareholders experience 
while preparing for or attending shareholder meetings. Further, the remarkable 
success of the internet as the probably most efficient de-intermediation instrument 
                                            
122 The most practicable way is effectively to by-pass the intermediaries, by mandating that 
intermediaries grant proxies or declarations of entitlement to the beneficial owners / account 
holders at the end of the chain, which can in turn log themselves into the voting system. In the 
digital age, these entitlements do not require a general renunciation of shareholder anonymity vis-
à-vis the corporation, because entitlements may be granted on the basis of figure combinations 
and other forms of digital authentication substituting for names of individuals and legal persons. 
- 51 - 
currently available requires managers to adjust their communication strategies to the 
needs of the addressees to a greater extent than a decade ago.123
Turning managers into talk-masters, however, is not an advisable solution: they 
should do the business, and only some of the business is Public and Investor 
Relations. Further, good managers are not necessarily good talk-masters. But, 
expertise with respect to presentation skills is available on the market. One may draw 
two possible conclusions from this observation. First, one could separate the content 
and the presentation of meetings, hence assigning authority for substantive issues to 
different persons than those who are assigned authority for procedural issues. 
Second, one could cut the shareholder meeting into many small, well-prepared and 
edited portions, thereby enabling shareholders to follow the argumentation, 
understand the issues at stake, and ask well-informed questions. Given that 
gathering and evaluating information in a short meeting is obviously impossible and 
that it is impractical to assign responsibilities for certain topics to some shareholders 
only (a quasi-horizontal cut through corporate topics), it is necessary to meet more 
than once a year (a quasi-vertical cut). Both alternatives would appeal to primarily 
dispersed shareholders, increase their individual utility and, consequently, decrease 
their apathy (as it would become less rational to be apathetic). 
b) Integrate or Abolish Substitutes 
Unsurprisingly, the market was faster in recognizing and responding to the 
shareholder needs discussed in the previous section, as frequently-held analyst and 
institutional investor conferences demonstrate. However, these conferences 
                                            
123 See Keith McArthur, “On-line era leaves media out of loop: PR expert”, The Globe and Mail, 21 
March 2005, at B5.  
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complicate the situation for shareholder meetings insofar as they partially substitute 
for the shareholder meeting itself. Professional investors rarely attend, or follow the 
procedure of, the meeting. Besides concerns of equality and fairness, which are not 
addressed here,124 the existence of the substitutes rendered the original obsolete.  
From the perspective of institutional investors, these institutions provide several  
advantages. First, they enable efficient communication with management, in a 
highly technical and focused language, without interference by unskilled retailers. 
Second, they enable periodic control of management in intervals that are shorter 
than only annually, usually in a quarterly interval. This reflects the fact that, in the 
digital age, a year is a long period. Third, in capital-market dependent economies, the 
institutional investors functionally substitute for the controlling shareholders 
(formerly existing) in Continental Europe.125 However, only some of the institutional 
investors can be represented on the firm’s board, and only some of the institutional 
investors want board seats, given the costs and a lack of incentives to take on the 
responsibility for many board meetings with few private benefits of control. 
Consequently, institutional investors developed the investors’ meetings as an 
intermediate institution between regular board meetings and shareholder meetings. 
From the perspective of management, the feedback provided by professional 
investors is crucial in estimating the possible investors’, and thus market’s, 
response to certain corporate decisions. Furthermore, exchange of knowledge 
increases management expertise. Finally, investor meetings enable co-ordination 
                                            
124 See Dirk Zetzsche, Aktionärsinformation in der börsennotierten Aktiengesellschaft (transl. 
Shareholder Information in Public Corporations), (Carl-Heymanns-Verlag, Köln: 2005 – 
forthcoming), at § 14.  
125 Zetzsche, Explicit and Implicit System, supra note 4, at D.V. 
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with key shareholders in order to protect management’s own position. Traditional 
shareholder meetings, management and professional investors hold, cannot 
effectively fulfil the above functions.126
From the perspective of retail investors, the result is mixed. On the one hand, since 
management and institutional investors exchange information and expectations, 
securities prices are likely to reflect more, and hopefully better information. On the 
other hand, these meetings render shareholder meetings themselves a useless 
formality because the decisions are in most cases, already made in the period 
between the investor meeting (which is typically held at the time the annual account 
is published) and the day of the shareholder meeting. Any deliberation on the day of 
the physical shareholder meeting is façade if all important decisions have, in fact, 
been made earlier. 
In considering the impact of these observations for the digital age, it is important to 
note that institutional investor meetings developed without any regulatory framework. 
Apparently, institutional, hence per se influential, investors require opportunities to 
exercise their influence and exchange ideas with management in, generally 
speaking, quarterly periods. There is apparently some “market demand” for frequent 
investor meetings. This observation is connected to the problems of periodical 
shareholder influence and complicacy / breadth of the annual meeting mentioned 
above.  
Under the current regime, the controlling influence of institutional investors 
effectively insulates management from retail investors. Efficient use of the internet, 
                                            
126 Supra note 115. 
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however, allows all investors to influence management at low costs. If web-based 
meetings of all classes of shareholders took place at shorter intervals, these 
meetings would necessarily increase pressure on management to align corporate 
policy with the interests of all shareholders, with two effects. First, integrating 
shareholder meetings into the institutional investor meetings framework would 
balance the power structure within the firm. Second, it may result in greater pressure 
on management. This direct pressure may even substitute for market pressure 
insofar as management is affected more directly through voting than indirectly 
through market response, involving high transaction costs. Under these conditions, it 
is reasonable to assume that shareholder decision-making and market-reaction 
would be aligned to a greater extent than it is today. 
Thus, traditional shareholder meeting procedures should be adjusted to the 
requirements which capital market needs have unveiled. This regards, in particular, 
the need for: (1) efficient communication; (2) more frequent shareholder events 
(quarterly rather than annually); and (3) a deliberation and testing environment for 
corporate decision making and forecasts. It remains to be examined how these aims 
can be achieved, in practice. 
c) Adjust Procedures to the Digital Age 
Finally, many procedural rules needs to be adjusted to the digital age. With respect to 
information, this requires the integration of modern technologies for gathering and 
evaluating information into the process of shareholder meetings.127 For example, the 
                                            
127 The following is a non-exclusive list of technologies which need to be integrated: RSS feed enables 
foregoing any intermediary if there is one centralized source of company information, such as the 
EDGAR-, SEDAR- or other systems. XBRL-standards will allow for cheap evaluation of information, 
and better organization of corporate information (e.g. through a link on each data containing 
additional information provided by the firm to any investor, analyst recommendations etc.). 
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doubling of information, such as mandatory disclosure on multiple websites or the 
answering of questions which have been answered electronically on the company’s 
website, is anachronistic, per se. The shareholder meeting of the future may rely on 
the corporate website as a powerful data gathering and evaluation tool, open to any 
investor.  
The same is true with respect to communication. The web enables transparent and 
well-documented discussions. If participants need to authenticate themselves before 
they use the system, fraud can be easily detected. Under these conditions, the 
rationale of the rigid North-American approach towards proxy regulation should be 
re-considered, as far as it concerns shareholders. 
Finally, voting rules contain many anachronistic details. For example, the procedural 
rules on shareholder meetings usually require an inspector or notary public or 
company secretary to supervise the voting procedures even though these people are 
hardly able to supervise the procedure given that most procedures involve highly 
technical issues.128 The function of the supervisor on behalf of the shareholders 
involves more and more technical procedures, and less legal and organizational 
issues. The power of inspectors etc. to ask specialists for technical assistance if 
necessary merely prevents the worst outcomes of the traditional system, but does 
not fix the problem itself. 
Further, it deems me inefficient that companies usually pay for two kinds of 
resources: On the one hand, the firm employs resources to organize shareholder 
meetings on behalf of management; on the other hand, it pays for resources that 
                                            
128 In particular: the technical infrastructure of the voting process; making sure that management does 
not editor or censor any of the questions asked by shareholders, etc. 
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control the organizational structure that was employed by management. Alternatively, 
shareholders could elect a “shareholder rights manager” who is responsible for all 
technical, legal and organizational procedures with regard to the meeting, and who is 
directly accountable to shareholders. The person himself needs to establish himself 
in the market for shareholder rights managers. Efficient shareholder voting would 
provide for a shareholder-oriented design of procedural rules. The traditional “double 
expense”-scheme would vanish. The shareholder rights manager would provide the 
appropriate level of “face-to-face” accountability, organize entertainment-features in 
presenting company information, and supervise that other shareholder needs are 
considered, such as system security or data protection, through electronic means.129 
Management would be deprived of its advantage of determining the procedure to be 
followed in shareholder meetings. Further, management’s conflict of interests in 
using corporate assets for improving their own position vis-à-vis the shareholders 
would be reduced. 
V. A Blueprint for Virtual Shareholder Meetings 
All these measures together result in a shareholder participation scheme that looks 
substantially different from the structure that we observe today. 
General Setting. Ideally, we would see the traditional shareholder meetings split into 
three distinct events (1) quarterly held “shareholder conferences”, for shareholder-to-
management information sharing and communication; (2) a permanent 
                                            
129 The shareholder rights manager proposed herein needs to be distinguished from the “corporate 
monitoring firm” proposed in Mark Latham, “Corporate Monitoring: New Shareholder Power Tool”, 
(1998) Financial Analysts Journal 54, 9-15, and “The Corporate Monitoring Firm”, (1999) Corporate 
Governance: An International Review 7, at 12-20. While Latham’s key point is informed decision 
making by shareholders achieved through voting instructions, the shareholder rights manager 
focuses on procedures, rather than substantive issues. 
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“communications chat-board” with a well-organized and user-friendly Q&A-database; 
and (3) “voting periods”. All measures are organized by a professional shareholder 
rights management firm [SRM], that who is responsible for procedural requirements 
and that organizes / moderates the events, including the sequel of topics to be 
discussed. The shareholders would elect the SRM on an annual basis. The 
corporation would pay the SRM’s salary and expenses, as defined in detail by the 
shareholders’ decision. Only shareholders (not management) may propose 
candidates for the SRM.  
The Shareholder Conference. The quarterly-held shareholder conferences would 
be substantially equivalent to traditional institutional investor conferences. However, 
notices with regard to these conferences would be forwarded in advance to all 
shareholders. Any other meeting of management with three or more investors must 
be organized following the same procedural rules as set out below (effectively 
reducing the number of such extra meetings taking place). The shareholder 
conference would be held virtually, with all persons interested in the topics being able 
to watch. Management would participate in the conferences online, sitting in 
corporate meeting studios being established around the world. Guests may 
participate in the meeting, either virtually or physically. The SRM would moderate the 
discussion and Q&A sessions in the shareholders’ best interest.  
During the conference, only shareholders authenticated in advance are entitled to 
ask questions, via web-cam, telephone, email or other communication techniques. 
Subject to the Articles of Association, other interested persons watching, who were 
previously authenticated or subject to management’s or the SRM’s discretion may 
ask questions. All questions would be available online and in real-time, and would be 
answered by management in person. Rules for wrongful disclosure apply to any 
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answer given in the meeting. If the articles so provide, shareholder questions may be 
answered in a priority sequence based on classes of shareholders or the number of 
shares held. For example, questions of shareholders holding a certain number of 
shares would be answered first in a general Q&A session, before questions of other 
shareholders would be considered. This sequel would be justified on the grounds that 
large shareholders have a greater interest in informed voting than do small 
shareholders who can sell easily and inexpensively. The meeting-manager would 
assign a topic number and a timeframe to incoming questions. All answers would be 
available in text format in a well-organized Q&A catalogue. In these shareholder 
conferences, management would be obliged to answer new questions. Old questions 
may be answered by reference to the Q&A system. Shareholders may protest that 
procedure to the SRM. Shortly after the conference, the SRM will provide 
documentaries with entertainment features (for example, a firm quiz show etc.) to 
shareholders, which will specifically attract retail shareholders to get informed about 
the corporation and exercise their voting rights. 
The Communications Board. The corporate website offers a link to a chat-board 
that will be administered / supervised / hosted by the SRM. All information given by 
management during the shareholder conference must be included by reference in the 
appropriate section. Information given to any person outside the conference must 
expressly be disclosed at the appropriate chat-board section, and included into the 
Q&A-catalogue. Management may participate in the discussion anytime it likes to do 
so. Shareholders holding 5% or more, however, may require management to answer 
a new question, subject to certain restrictions re trade secrets etc. The petitioners 
may establish the threshold online, using the shareholder authentication issued at the 
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last record date. If management denies the answer, a poll may be taken on that 
question, as described below.  
Voting. Shareholders vote electronically on the corporate website within one month 
following the quarterly shareholder conference. The voting tool can be accessed from 
the same section of the website as the Q&A tool and the chat-board. Voting takes 
place on any matter required by shareholders representing 5% or more of the shares 
at the day preceding the day of notice, or by management. Any vote may be of on 
advisory or a mandatory character. Shareholders, however, remain entitled to vote 
on the issues which are stipulated under corporate law today. Shareholders would 
vote upon these issues in the “voting period” following the conference disclosing the 
annual statements. 
Given that many securities laws require institutional investors to disclose their voting 
behavior and that many shareholders are incapable of satisfactorily considering 
voting proposals, institutional investors may be entitled to disclose their voting 
behavior in advance of the voting period.130 If appropriate, the SRM may offer voting 
schemes of certain institutional investors or certain large shareholders as alternative 
voting pattern to management’s proposals. This will incentivize institutional and large 
investors to exercise their rights as soon as possible and thereby reduce information 
costs for small shareholders. 
Review. Efficient voting is likely to substitute for review in many circumstances. If this 
is not the case, the greater likelihood of greater support for a well-reasoned proposal 
and, thus, the lower cost risk, will incentivize shareholders to accurately account for 
                                            
130 See Mark Latham, “Democracy and Infomediaries” (2003) Corporate Governance 11:2, 91, at 95. 
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their review before calling for support by other shareholders. On the other hand, the 
fact that shareholders refrain from accurately accounting for the action they propose 
may indicate abuse in itself. At least, it will result in lesser support from other 
shareholders. Under these conditions it is justified to increase / impose certain 
thresholds for shareholder actions, particularly for derivative and class actions. Thus, 
the internet may help to lessen litigation costs as well. 
Authentication. Obviously, the above structure requires an accessible, inexpensive 
and smooth authentication process. Given that shareholders require authentication 
quasi-permanently, it is likely that intermediaries will restructure their depository 
business, as a means of reducing costs. 
Costs. The software infrastructure for the aforementioned procedure is costly in its 
first implementation, but economies of scale are significant in the market for standard 
software. Employing a SRM will be costly, of course. However, corporations 
currently pay the expenses for investor relations managers, shareholder meeting 
organizers, and notary publics / inspectors. Further, they regularly pay for investor 
conferences, annual and extraordinary general meetings. All of these institutions will 
become partially useless. Thus, the costs for the SRM are merely shifted – and do 
not represent new costs. The same is true with other tools proposed herein, for 
example, the Q&A catalogue. This catalogue already exists in the back offices of all 
major corporations.131 On an intermediate perspective, the structure proposed herein 
is, at least, not more expensive than the current scheme. 
                                            
131 This is, on the one hand, the author’s practical experience, on the other hand, it is evidenced by 
anecdotal evidence in Bottomley, supra note 18, at 47. 
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VI. Conclusion 
The transition from the traditional shareholder meeting, which is based on the 
physical attendance of shareholders, towards a truly virtual shareholder meeting is 
incomplete worldwide. While some jurisdictions have advanced to the next level of 
internet-based shareholder participation more progressively than others, none of the 
jurisdictions have, in fact, replicated all functions of traditional shareholder meetings 
in a regime for virtual shareholder meetings to a satisfactory extent. 
Legislatures willing to finalize the transition towards virtual shareholder meetings 
need to give up the limits with respect to time and place which the traditional meeting 
provides, and integrate shareholder meetings in the quarterly held institutional 
investors’ meeting. Therefore, certain legal and practical barriers needs to be 
removed, and the process needs to be adjusted to the requirements of the digital 
age. The latter involves, in particular, (1) the use of RSS-Feed and XBRL-
technologies for gathering and evaluating information, (2) the use of the company’s 
website as a central communication board for all shareholders, and (3) the election of 
a shareholder rights manager by the shareholder body, with the financial, technical, 
and organizational responsibility regarding the means of exercising shareholder 
rights.  
A virtual shareholder meeting as described above offers shareholders and 
proxyholders “a [truly] reasonable opportunity to participate in the meeting,” as 
theoretically required, but not realized, under Delaware and Canadian law. If these 
steps are taken, “the death of the “in-person” shareholder meeting”132 will be close. 
                                            
132 Beske, supra note 2, at 8-19. 
